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Summary
Digital Rights Management (DRM) controls and manages rights for digital media.
In the second generation of DRM, the definition of rights has been extended from
digital rights to “all form of rights usages over both tangible and intangible assets
– both in physical and digital form – including management of rights holders’ re-
lationships.” because of pressing needs from real applications such as e-commerce
and e-government.
As in the first generation definition which emphasizes on copyright, previous
research efforts on DRM focus more on the copyright protection for electronic
publishing. This thesis follows the second generation definition, addressing DRM
issues for electronic documents in business and administrative environment. The
“rights management” poses requirements of security and interoperability. The
security requirement mainly concerns authentication and access control for both
electronic and paper documents; while the interoperability requires a system to
maintain trusted relationship among different parties by means of describing, iden-
tifying, trading, protecting, monitoring and tracking rights usages among these
parties. Based on the requirements, we have proposed and developed three key
novel techniques for the second generation DRM system:
(i) Authentication method for electronic documents. The method contains a
digital watermark scheme and a content-based authentication technique for elec-
vi
tronic documents. The watermark scheme utilizes the render sequences of charac-
ters. It features large information carrying capacity and robustness over document
format transcoding. The authentication method is based on the NP-complete Ex-
act Traveling Salesman Problem, which provides strong cryptographic security
with short key length.
(ii) Authentication method for printed paper documents. The method utilizes
the inherent non-repeatable randomness existing in the printing process. The
randomness of the printing signature of a particular character or pattern results
in unique features for each printed document. By registering and verifying these
features, we authenticate content integrity and originality of printed documents.
The authentication methods for both electronic and printed documents together
solve the security requirement for the DRM system.
(iii) Model and framework for XML based access control for electronic docu-
ments and document source data. The access control model implements traditional
role-based access control using XML language, with syntactic and semantic lan-
guage specification and validation based on XML Schema and XML Schematron.
The core permissions are described using extended ODRL standard. Adhering
to a trusted access control model leads to a sound theoretical background, and
adopting XML language increases the interoperability in multi-user environment.
The access control model is further integrated into a complete DRM framework
with security features for both electronic and paper documents.
vii
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The understanding of Digital Rights Management (DRM) has been constantly
evolving since its first introduction in the 1970s. So far, the most up-to-date,
comprehensive and well-accepted definition of DRM was suggested by Iannella of
IPR Systems in the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) Digital Rights Manage-
ment workshop in 2001:
“Digital Rights Management (DRM) involves the description, identi-
fication, trading, protection, monitoring and tracking of all forms of
rights usages over both tangible and intangible assets – both in physical
and digital form – including management of rights holders’ relation-
ships. [Ian01]”
This definition is often referred to as the “second-generation of DRM”, whereas
its ancestor, the “first-generation of DRM”, focuses on using security and encryp-
tion techniques to solve the issues of unauthorized copying and distribution of
digital contents. It is now much clear that the “first-generation DRM” is more
related to the “digital copyright management” than “digital rights management”.
It is more based on traditional security-encryption-enforcement views. The second
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generation extends DRM to cover all forms of rights usages over both tangible and
intangible assets – both in physical and digital form, and the management process
includes the description, identification, trading, protection, monitoring and track-
ing. It is “digital management of rights”, as opposed to “management of digital
rights”. In other words, DRM manages all rights, not only the rights applicable
to permissions over digital contents.
The complete framework of DRM system contains both technical and non-
technical (commercial, social and legal) aspects of rights management [oAP00,
RTM01]. The commercial aspect deals with business and marketing activities,
e.g., the pay-per-use versus subscription pricing model. The social aspect deals
with customer education and the concept of fair use (the right to use copyrighted
material without permission in certain cases). The legal aspect deals with statu-
tory and contractual enforcement of digital rights. In this thesis, we only tackle
the technical aspect of the DRM. However, the non-technical aspect remains an
indispensable part to form an effective and end-to-end rights management system.
1.1 Motivation
Research activities in the digital rights management for electronic documents have
been growing due to its commercial potential. It has been estimated the DRMmar-
ket for electronic documents will reach $3.5b by the year 2005 [RTM01, PDF01].
However, adoption of electronic documents into any serious business and admin-
istrative transactions is very limited due to the unavailability of effective means
for managing rights and usages.
Let us look at an example where a shipper consigns with a shipping company
to ship some goods from port A to port B. They are required to comply with
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international regulations, customs, and special treatments of different shipped
materials. The process is very document intensive. Various documents involved
include invoices, packaging lists, certificate of origin, quality inspection certificates,
letter of credits, bill of ladings, etc. Digital rights management system tries to
establish a trust relationship among all the parties involved by managing these
documents and controlling their usages. To achieve this, DRM system must be
interoperable and secure. We now look into more detailed requirements on stages
of the document management workflow.
• Interoperability: The interoperability requirement applies at the stages of
document creation and deployment. It requires direct data exchange among
different parties involved in transactions. These parties are legally indepen-
dent companies, physically located at various locations, each may have their
own computer systems running different software packages, with different
databases, and using different data exchange format such as EDI or XML.
Inability to interoperate may lead to manual processing of data. Here in
the document domain, manual processing includes deploying documents by
means of re-typing or DA/AD conversions such as printing, scanning, and
optical character recognition (OCR). These conversions are very inefficient
and error prone.
• Security: The security requirement can be further viewed as consisting of
access control, authenticity and originality requirements.
– Access control: Access control applies at the stages of document cre-
ation and deployment. It describes a set of policies for each party to
access the documents. For example, a policy to allow certain internal
documents be viewable by the shipping company but not the shipper.
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It also provides enforcement mechanisms to ensure all parties are com-
plying with the policies.
– Authenticity: Authenticity applies at all the stages of document man-
agement. It requires that the documents used in the transaction are
genuine in terms of the contents and appearance. For example, the
packaging list must be the one properly verified and signed by the au-
thorized personnel.
– Originality: Originality applies at the stage when the documents have
been distributed to the end users. It requires a method to make sure
that the documents are original rather than being duplicated, even
though the contents are genuine. The originality requirement is par-
ticularly important for business and administrative documents, such
as the bills of lading: claiming of goods with a duplicated copy is not
allowed.
Techniques in the existing electronic products and services cannot meet all the
requirements. The reasons include:
• Access control methods with XML based rights mark-up standards are still
immature. Currently, all rights mark-up languages have been designed for
media and electronic publishing industry where only access control policies
for end-user are addressed. Use of these languages in business domain with
respect to document creation and multi-level deployment security has not
been studied and verified. Therefore, exchange of sensitive data electroni-
cally among untrusted parties is still a major concern.
• It is difficult to authenticate electronic documents while allowing data for-
mat transcoding. Traditional digital signature schemes do not work here.
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For example, a shipping company located in Singapore uses A4 paper size to
format all electronic documents and generates digital signatures to authen-
ticate the documents. But a shipper located in USA requires Letter paper
size. So the electronic documents sent from A to B must be reformatted. In
this case the authenticity of digital signatures is voided. A more robust and
content-related authentication method is hence needed.
• There is no absolute way to prevent electronic documents from being dupli-
cated, and the duplication of electronic documents always has 100 percent
perfect fidelity. As a result, justifying the originality of electronic docu-
ments is not possible. Instead, paper documents with hand-signatures are
used in many circumstances. However, verifying the originality of machine
generated paper documents, especially printed paper documents, remains a
challenge to the research community.
In short, the requirements on managing (the description, identification, trad-
ing, protection, monitoring and tracking of) all forms of rights usages over both
tangible and intangible assets – both in physical and digital form make the DRM
problem much more intricate. Achievements in technologies of protecting digital
contents in the past decades have little adoption by business and administrative
applications so far. It may due to major concerns on the right management issues
regarding interoperability and security. In this thesis we shall address these DRM
issues and propose possible solutions.
5
1.2 Problem statement
The challenging issue that we are addressing is digital rights management for
electronic documents. We concentrate our research on the management of docu-
ments for business and administrative purpose, with emphasis on interoperability,
authenticity and originality. We do not address the copyright protection, which
usually is not a problem in this particular domain. However, some of our research
results are actually applicable to copyright protection.
We further state the issues as follows:
1. Maintain document authenticity while allowing data format transcoding.
Data format transcoding is inevitable if the document is to be shared by
heterogeneous computer systems. It is one of the major building blocks for
multi-system interoperation.
2. Preserve document authenticity when an authentic electronic document is
printed onto paper, uniquely identify printed original paper document, and
detect its duplication.
It is well known that paper documents are still legal instruments for most
business and administrative transactions by the law. Authentication of
printed paper documents is hence vital to build an end-to-end rights man-
agement system.
3. Develop an integrated DRM system framework which provides ready solu-
tions to applications in the field of e-government and e-commerce.
This includes system modeling, rights definition and access control mecha-
nisms, etc.
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1.3 Contribution of the thesis
Having studied the whole document flow, including its creation, processing, ap-
proval, deployment, archival and verification, and the digital rights management
roles (“the description, identification, trading, protection, monitoring and track-
ing”) in this flow, we have designed a system framework with respect to the tech-
nical aspect of digital rights management for electronic documents. Three key
issues have been identified and novel methods have been developed as solutions to
the three issues:
1. A document watermark and authentication method for electronic docu-
ments.
We have developed a novel watermark scheme for electronic documents which
hides information into the document during document formatting. The hid-
den information survives document format transcoding. Data regarding to
the rights description of the document can be embedded into document us-
ing the watermark scheme. We also propose a document authentication
method based on the watermark. With this method, document authenticity
is maintained in an interoperable environment.
2. A document authentication method for printed paper documents.
We have developed a novel authentication method for printed paper doc-
uments. Our method can prevent unauthorized modification or duplica-
tion of authentic printed documents. With authentication methods for both
electronic documents and printed paper documents, the DRM system is
complete with regard to “all forms of rights usages over both tangible and
intangible assets”.
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3. An XML-based access control and application framework.
We define XML based access control framework to ease document creation
and exchange. The framework is based on the “role-based access control
(RBAC) ” model, which provides a sound theoretical foundation. We have
developed a novel implementation method to describe definitions and con-
straints in RBAC using pure XML technologies such as XML Schema and
XML Schematron. Base the model, we integrated the proposed document
authentication methods into the framework to form a complete DRM system.
These three solutions address the security and interoperability requirements
in the document deployment, end-user printing and creation stages respectively,






























Figure 1.1: Proposed solutions in document workflow
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trol framework manages author’s access rights to the XML data source, which
enables exchanging of idea and data within a secure and trusted environment (1).
After the data source has been finalized, a document formatting system formats
the data into human readable document, according to a style sheet. In this pro-
cess, descriptions about the access rights to the document are embedded into the
document using document watermark scheme. The watermark also serves as au-
thenticity evidence to protect the rights descriptions and document contents. The
watermarked electronic document is final version for deployment (2). When the
electronic document reaches the end user, the user can either print it onto paper,
or store the electronic version for archival. For the first case, our authentication
method for printed paper documents can protect the paper document from unau-
thorized modification or duplication, thus bridges the authenticity from electronic
domain to physical (paper) domain. For the second case, even though the elec-
tronic document is to be converted into other formats, the document watermark
scheme guarantees that the embedded information is still preserved (3).
It can be concluded from the above workflow that the three key solutions
enable rights protection along the whole life cycle of electronic documents. They
manage rights over both “tangible and intangible assets – both in physical and
digital form”.
1.4 Overview of the thesis
We discuss related works on DRM system architectures in Chapter 2. In Chap-
ter 3, we proposed the watermark scheme and authentication method for electronic
documents, followed by an authentication method for printed paper documents in
chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses XML based access control and DRM framework.
9




We, in this chapter, review some previous works regarding digital rights man-
agement. Our review follows three major directions: the authentication methods
for electronic documents, the authentication methods for paper documents, and
the frameworks and implementations of DRM systems. These works are closely
related to the security and interoperability requirements of DRM system for elec-
tronic documents. They collectively form the background of our research topic.
2.1 Authentication and watermark schemes for
electronic documents
Authenticity is one of the essential requirements contributing to the security of
the DRM system for electronic documents. Authenticating electronic documents
has been a subject of research in both cryptography and multimedia community.
A general model of the authentication problem is depicted in Figure 2.1 [MV99].
Transmitter Alice transmits a message X to receiver Bob. The message is trans-











Figure 2.1: Authentication model
the message. In order for Bob to be assured that the message is indeed origi-
nated from Alice and Carol has not modified it, Alice computes an authentication
tag (or authenticator) a, attaches it to the message X to form message Y . The
computing of a is based on the authentication key, which is kept secret by Alice.
When Bob receives the message, he can verify, using the verification key, that a
is a valid authenticator for message X. Note that the verification key here can
be either public, which constitutes public verification, or secret to receiver Bob,
which constitutes private verification.
In the typical cryptographic perspective, Carol is considered as a malicious
attacker. Her role is trying to create a fake message Y ′ = (X ′, a′) which she hopes
that Bob would accept as authentic and originating from Alice. Digital signature
schemes and message authentication code (MAC) [MvOV97] can effectively keep
Carol out of the game. But problem rises when Carol is not malicious. For
example, to serve the interoperability purpose as discussed in section 1.1, Carol
can be sort of document format conversion software, who converts documents sent
from Alice into the specific format that Bob accepts. Since Carol does not know
the authentication key, she cannot just convert the document and re-create the
authenticator a. Instead, she must create Y ′ = (X ′, a), with X ′ 6= X and Y ′
still acceptable by Bob. The problem is, how to design an authenticator a which
authenticates both X and X ′. We refer to this problem the authenticator problem.
How to associate the authenticator a with the message X to form Y is another
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problem that draws great interests from multimedia research community. Simply
appending a to the end of X or storing it inside the file header is not a viable
solution because the authenticator can always be easily removed. A more preferred
solution is to embed authenticator a into message X itself, therefore extending the
authentication capability to the large number of existing document formats that
do not provide any explicit means of including an authenticator (for example, the
industrial standard PostScript format) [MV99]. Another advantage of doing so is
that it would be very convenient for the authenticator to survive document format
transcoding. This partially solves the authenticator problem as well. However,
how to embed information into electronic documents still remains a problem. We
refer to this problem the embedding problem.
The authenticator problem and the embedding problem have attracted tremen-
dous research activities in the recent decades. So far, the most widely adopted
solutions are content-based authentication and digital watermark, respectively.
2.1.1 Content-based authentication
In content-based authentication, the authenticator is generated from the contents
of the message, rather than the binary representation of the message. By doing
so, the authenticator exhibits certain robustness that it keeps valid regardless of
whatever formats or transformations the message undertakes, provided that the
message content remains unchanged. This fundamentally solves the authenticator
problem. Obviously, defining and extracting of contents from the message is the
foremost task. As one example, in digital image domain, Bhattarcharjee [BK98]
suggests the use of feature points such as edge maps in image data as the definition
for image contents. Adjustments made to the image, for example, brightening,
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alteration of contrast, lossy compression or format transcoding will not change the
edges so that the content is unchanged. However, this method is not satisfactory
since it is highly probable that two distinct images have very similar edge maps
(human faces, for example). Increasing the type of feature points does not solve the
problem. The underlying reason is that the word “content” is itself very abstract
and subject to individual’s perception. Content extraction for multimedia data is
still an unsolved problem in spite of enormous advances in image understanding
techniques [MV99].
Comparatively, content definition and extraction for text-based electronic doc-
uments is much easier. This is because text data have lower bandwidth and hence
less abstract level (considering that the computer understands the word “apple”
far better than a picture of an apple). Contents can be extracted by direct ana-
lyzing the text. For business and administrative documents, the use of structured
text mark-up languages such as XML further eases content definition because it
eliminates the needs for semantic natural language understanding. These favor-
able properties make content-based authentication for electronic documents very
practical. It is natural to consider using digital signature schemes or message
authentication codes onto text data as the solution to the authenticator prob-
lem. However, this solution is not applicable alone without solving the embedding
problem.
2.1.2 Digital watermark
Digital watermarking has been an active research area for nearly 50 years [CM01].
It is the process of embedding some information (payload) into digital content
(host) such that the payload can later be extracted or detected. Watermark
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schemes solve the embedding problem by treating message X as the host and au-
thenticator a as the payload. The embedding of information is generally achieved
through manipulating redundant information in the host data [BGNL96]. Redun-
dant information presents either in the human perceptual system [CM97] or in the
structure of the message [Sim98]. It is well know that multimedia data contain
plenty of redundant information. For example, the least significant bit (LSB) for
each pixel in digital image is considered redundant because changes made to these
bits are not noticeable by human eyes. This simple property leads to a series of
image watermark and authentication schemes, such as the Yeung and Mintzer’s
fragile watermark authentication scheme [YM97]. More advanced multimedia wa-
termark schemes include the spread-spectrum scheme [TRvS+93, vSTO94, WD96,
CKLS97, WD97] for digital image, the echo-hiding scheme [GBL96] for digital au-
dio, etc. All these schemes have been well studied in both theoretical and practical
perspectives. Some excellent reviews on watermark schemes for multimedia data
can be found in [PAK99, PD01, BJ97, DMH98, SHG98, HK99]. Despite these
achievements, watermark schemes for text-based electronic documents have been
lagging behind with respect to quantity and quality. This is due to the fact that
redundant information in text data is rare and hard to explore, and any modifica-
tions to text content are easily noticeable even by casual readers [BGNL96]. In the
following we focus our discussion on watermark schemes for electronic documents
only.
Watermark schemes can be classified according to different criteria, which are
listed in Table 2.1. For the authentication model shown in Figure 2.1, the water-
mark scheme is used to embed the authenticator into the document. It must be






Method of payload insertion
Additive watermark
Quantize and replace watermark





– requires original message
Public (oblivious) watermark
– does not require original message
Robustness
Robust watermark – survives manipulation
Fragile watermark – detects manipulation
Table 2.1: Classification of watermark schemes
original document. It must be robust against format transcoding, but sensitive
against unauthorized modifications. Being visible or invisible is not important
for authentication purpose, but if visible, the watermark shall not interfere with
the contents. Being spatial domain and quantize/replace watermark can reduce
the processing complexity and the size of the document. They are preferred but
not mandatory. We now review some existing document watermark schemes and
examine what classes they belong to.
Existing watermark schemes for electronic documents contains two kinds of
approaches: one based on the modification of the layout or appearance of the
document, and the other based on the modification of the text.
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Layout and appearance watermark
In layout and appearance watermark schemes, the layout of the text or the page im-
age is altered based on the payload. These schemes are applicable both electronic
documents and paper documents. In the decoding process, the paper documents
must be digitized first, then the alterations are detected.
Line shift encoding. Line shift encoding algorithm was first introduced in
[BLMO94], and further developed in [BLMO95b, BLMO95a, LMBO95, ML97,
low98, LML98, BLM99]. In this approach, a payload is embedded into the docu-
ment image by vertically displacing an entire text line. In the decoding process,
the digital image of a page is obtained and the baseline or centroid of each line
is calculated using horizontal profile. The distance between two adjacent lines is
then measured. Since a document’s initial line space is uniform, the presence or
absence of a payload can be detected by analyzing the measured distances without
knowing the original document image.
Theoretically, a paragraph of n lines can hold a payload of n bits. But in a real
implementation, differential encoding technique [BLMO95a] is used, in which all
odd text lines are kept unmoved, and even lines are either shifted up, moved down
or unmoved to represent information {-1, +1, 0}. Differential encoding technique
can greatly improve the accuracy of the decoding process, but at the same time it
will cut the information carrying capacity by about 70%. A payload of about 0.7n
bits can be embedded in an n-line page (e.g., 10 bits in an A4 page with double
spaced 12 point font).
Experiments show that line shift encoding will survive several generations of
photocopying successfully [BLMO94]. But an attacker can easily defeat it by
re-spacing lines either uniformly or randomly. Since the information carrying ca-
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pacity is small, embedding the authenticator using line shift encoding is very inse-
cure. There exists non-negligible possibility that a randomly re-spaced document
contains a valid authenticator (e.g., 1/1024 in the above example).
In conclusion, line shift encoding belongs to the category of invisible, public
and robust watermark. It may be useful for copyright protection. But it does not
meet the requirements for content-based document authentication.
Word shift encoding. Word shift encoding was introduced together with line
shift encoding in [BLMO94, BLMO95b, BLMO95a, LMBO95, ML97, low98, LML98,
BLM99]. This method alters a document image by horizontally shifting words
within text lines to encode a payload. It features much larger information carry-
ing capacity than line shift encoding. But since most document formatting tools
use variable spaces between words to justify text, the decoding process will need
the original document to determine which word has been shifted.
An attacker can eliminate the embedded information by re-spacing shifted
words. In most cases this kind of attack requires much more manual interventions
than attacking line shift encoded documents, because it is generally hard to do
segmentation of words automatically and properly within the mixture of different
fonts, symbols and equations. Word shift encoding features the same robustness
as line shift encoding.
In conclusion, word shift encoding belongs to the category of invisible, private
and robust watermark. It may also be useful for copyright protection. Since it is a
private watermark scheme, copyright assertion must resort to trusted third-party
who has access to the original document. This creates more complex issues about
the proof of original, which are out of the scope of this chapter. Word shift encod-
ing does not meet the requirements for content-based document authentication
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either.
Feature encoding. Feature encoding is the third method introduced in [BLMO94,
BLMO95b, BLMO95a, LMBO95, ML97, LML98, BLM99]. The document image
is examined for chosen text features, and those features are altered or not altered
depending on the payload. Some possible choices of text features are the upward,
vertical end-lines of letters – for example the tops of letters b, d, h, etc. These
end-lines are altered by either extending or shortening their length.
An attacker will have to identify which text feature and which letters are altered
in order to perform a successful attack. Obviously it has to be done manually with
reference to the unaltered fonts.
Feature encoding has the same robustness as line shift encoding and word shift
encoding. It is invisible, and can be considered as public watermark scheme. But
the watermark detection requires a large number of altered and unaltered letters
for comparison. It greatly limits the information carrying capacity.
A secure electronic publishing trial was run on October, 1995 by IEEE Commu-
nications Society (COMSOC). The issued journal IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications contains unique digital watermark using the above mentioned
methods for each recipient. The purpose of using watermark is to discourage and
track illegal dissemination of the documents, but not to authenticate the docu-
ments. A report of this trial is in [Bra96].
Character spacing width sequence coding. Character spacing width se-
quence coding was introduced in [Cho99]. It addresses the problem that word
shift encoding is not applicable to Asian languages such as Chinese, Japanese or
Thai that do not have sufficiently large space as word boundary. This method
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alters the horizontal space between adjacent characters to encode information.
The decoding process will need the original document image if the unencoded
characters are not uniformly spaced, e.g., the Thai characters.
Character spacing width sequence coding has the same pros and cons of the
three previous methods. Further more, for languages such as Chinese or Korean
whose characters as well as spaces between characters are all fixed, a watermarked
document will be quite distinguishable and suspicious.
High resolution watermarking. A document is created to have two or more
components, with one of the components representing a watermark object or a
background object. A high-resolution pattern is embedded in the watermark or
background object, so that it is not detectable by human eye but recognizable by a
special purpose device [Ada99]. The high-resolution pattern can carry information
relating to the creation and controlling of the document, signatures, etc. Detection
of the pattern does not require the original document so it is public watermark
scheme.
The patent [Ada99] says that the high-resolution pattern is non-removable by
attacks such as photocopying and scanning. But in fact a photocopier with low
resolution will just blur everything on the image, thus erase the high-resolution
patterns. So this method is not likely to be as robust as it suggests.
Noise placement encoding. In noise placement encoding [Max94], informa-
tion is inserted in a document by adding a noise signal that is barely visible. Noise
is least noticeable when it occurs at natural boundaries in an image like the edge
of letters. Based on this phenomenon, two different set of fonts are designed which
look alike but differ in a small number of positions. In the unencoded document
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the fonts are randomly selected for each character. In the encoded document, the
font that has been selected for the unencoded document is switched to another or
not, to transmit a bit of information.
Noise placement encoding does not survive printing or photocopying. It has
large information carrying capacity since theoretically each character can hold 1
bit of information. But the detection of embedded information requires the original
document for font comparison, so noise placement encoding is private watermark
scheme. It is not suitable for document authentication.
Conclusion. Layout and appearance watermark schemes treat electronic docu-
ments as binary images, and try to embed data by modifying inconspicuous details
in the images. They are invisible watermark schemes. Extraction of embedded
data can be either public or private. Public watermark schemes usually have less
information carrying capacity than private ones.
All of these watermark schemes have been proposed for copyright protection.
They assume that the attacker will use image processing software packages or
photocopies to remove the watermark. Such assumption is very limited. It should
be noted that Optical Character Recognition (OCR) system can be used to de-
feat all layout and appearance watermark schemes by converting the document
images back to text and re-formatting the text files. In [BLMO95a], the author
argues that OCR technology does not always recognize characters correctly, and
the current technology used to reconstruct a document is imperfect. There also
exist special techniques which beguile OCR systems into giving incorrect out-
puts [CB03]. However, with human assistance, OCR attack is always possible. In
fact this attack is widely used for book piracy in East Asian countries.
Layout and appearance watermark schemes are not suitable for document au-
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thentication. This is due to the fact that none public schemes have sufficient
information carrying capacity to hold the content-based authenticator.
Text watermark
In text watermark, the text contents of electronic documents are altered based on
the payload. The literature provides three categories of text watermark schemes:
the open space watermark, the syntactic watermark and the semantic watermark.
Open space watermark. Open space watermark scheme [BGNL96] is based on
the fact that changing the number of trailing spaces has little chance of changing
the meaning of a phase or a sentence, and a casual reader is unlikely to take notice
of modifications to the white spaces. This method embeds some spaces after each
terminating character (e.g., a period), at the end of each line, or in the margin.
Those appended spaces together can represent some payload information. Since
spaces are invisible, open space watermark is invisible watermark scheme. The
extraction of payload is done by counting extra spaces, so it is public watermark
scheme. Open space watermark is useful as long as text remains in ASCII format,
even copy-and-paste operation can not remove the payload.
Syntactic watermark. There are many circumstances where punctuation is
ambiguous or when mis-punctuation has low impact on the meaning of the text
contents. For example, “bread, butter, and milk” and “bread, butter and milk”
are both considered correct usage of commas in list syntax [BGNL96, KH02].
This creates some flexibility in expressing the same idea. Each version of the
sentence can be used to express distinct information about the payload. Syntactic
watermark is private watermark scheme, because the extraction of payload needs
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the original text for comparison. It is invisible watermark, but inconsistent use
of punctuation is noticeable, and there are cases where changing the punctuation
will impact the clarity, or even the meaning of the text. This method should be
used with caution [BGNL96].
Semantic watermark. Semantic watermark is similar to the syntactic water-
mark. It substitutes words in the text using their synonyms selectively. For
example, big can be substituted with large, or A.M. can be substituted with a.m.
[BGNL96, Nie99, KH02]. Assigning each synonym substitution with a value, then
the set of all substitutions can be used to identify the payload. For the same reason
as syntactic watermark, semantic watermark is invisible and private watermark
scheme. However, the nuance of meanings of synonyms can cause problem under
different context. This method should also be used with caution too.
Conclusion. Text watermark are invisible watermark schemes. Like layout and
appearance watermark schemes, they are also proposed for copyright protection
originally. Since the alterations are made to the text contents, text watermark
can survive OCR attacks. However, changing punctuations or substituting words
requires manual processing, which render text watermark schemes very ineffective.
Text watermark schemes are not suitable for document authentication either.
The insufficient information carrying capacity constitutes one reason. The other
reason is that changing punctuations or substituting words are not always applica-
ble in electronic documents. For critical documents such as those for business and
administrative purpose, every word may have significant importance. Improper
substitution can lead to disastrous consequences.
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2.1.3 Discussion
A complete solution to the authentication problem contains both the solution to
the authenticator problem and the solution to the embedding problem. These two
problems have been well studied for the multimedia data, but not for electronic
documents. Although the authenticator problem is easily solvable in this case
using cryptographic means, the embedding problem presents some unique chal-
lenges. This is mainly due to the lacking of redundant information in electronic
documents which greatly limits the information carrying capacity of the embed-
ding process. It is difficult for any existing schemes to hold a simple authenticator
of several hundred bits into a page of text data, not to mention other auxiliary
data such as rights descriptions. Thus, there is imperative need to develop new
watermark schemes in order to solve the embedding problem.
2.2 Authentication methods for printed docu-
ments
In business and administrative environment, authenticity and originality are the
two basic requirements for any paper document to be considered valid. In the tra-
ditional paper-based world, when a document is generated, it is usually signed /
issued / approved by one or more authorized persons, with their signatures or seals
to show the authenticity. The document with original signatures is considered to
be original, authentic or legitimate. In the printed world, there are also require-
ments for such signatures to show the authenticity and originality of a document.
Existing techniques towards meeting these requirements can be categorized into
four classes: the use of special materials, fingerprints, digital encoding, and visual
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cryptography / optical watermark.
2.2.1 Use of special materials
These solutions are based on either physical means or chemical means, such as
special high-resolution (>4000dpi) printers not available in the open market, spe-
cial papers/inks that are very sensitive to re-produce [Bor93, KY00, Gre87, GJ00,
Gre00, Zei00], and hologram labels [CJ89]. By controlling the availability of these
materials, no forgery or duplication of the document is possible. However, due to
the high cost of both the equipment and the efforts for controlling their use, these
solutions are only used in applications which have strict security requirements,
such as currency notes, checks, etc.
2.2.2 Fingerprints
The idea of fingerprinting is to make each copy of a document unique so that
illegal copies are identifiable, or the person who made illegal copies is traceable.
This idea was first introduced by Wagner in [Wag83], and then developed for
various applications. In [NWK93], nonuniformities in disk medium are utilized as
fingerprint to discourage illegal copying of files. In [Bra02], the width of each strip
cut produced by a shredder is identified as the fingerprint, which in turn is used to
trace the particular shredder that has been used. As for paper documents, Me´tois
et al. [MYSS02] have proposed an identification system based on the naturally
occurring inhomogeneities of the surface of paper. A special purpose imaging
device is developed to capture the texture and fiber pattern of the paper. The
pattern is then registered as a unique fingerprint for later retrieval and comparison.
Physical fingerprints usually offer strong protection against duplication attempts.
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However, the medium is not content-related. So the integrity of the contents is
not protected. Furthermore, the identification of typically invisible fingerprint
often requires special devices. This inevitably increases the cost of the system. As
a result, these methods are only used in applications which emphasize more on
medium security than content integrity, such as checks, tickets, etc.
2.2.3 Digital encoding
Originating from cryptographic theory, these approaches intend to transfer digi-
tal signature onto paper documents. Such approaches include bar codes [PSW90,
PSW92] and information hiding (notably digital watermarking) [CKLS97, RG98]
techniques. These methods add some machine readable information onto the doc-
ument to serve as a digital signature. Only authorized persons have access to the
secret information required to generate the digital signature, so the authenticity
of the document is protected. However, since the information is machine readable,
it can also be copied or scanned using photocopiers or scanners. The originality
of the document is not protected effectively. Digital encoding methods have been
widely used in applications which require machine based authentication, such as
bills, ID cards, and so on.
2.2.4 Visual cryptography / optical watermark
Visual cryptography utilizes secret sharing to split a graphical pattern into differ-
ent pieces in a manner that the pattern becomes visible if and only if the shares
are stacked together [NS94, Sha96]. By doing this, a paper document with one
share printed can be validated visually using the remaining shares. Optical wa-
termarks is an improvement over visual cryptography in terms of the ability to
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hide multiple layers of graphical information and enhanced visual quality with
easy alignment [HW00]. Both visual cryptography and optical watermark have
been designed for manual authentication of documents. They are most suitable
in applications where the convenience of verification is important such as brand
protection, ticketing, etc. However, both of these techniques cannot disprove the
authenticity of a photocopy or scanned-copy of an original document.
2.2.5 Discussion
We summarize the pros and cons of the existing authentication techniques for pa-





Special materials Yes Yes No Very high
Fingerprinting Yes Yes No High
Digital encoding Yes No Yes Low
Visual cryptography
Yes No Yes Low
& optical watermark
Table 2.2: Existing techniques for authenticating printed documents
satisfy all the security requirements for electronic documents. The inherent short-
comings of existing authentication techniques have limited their applications to
niche areas. Developing a new technique suitable for business and administrative
document processing is therefore imperative.
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2.3 Frameworks and implementations of DRM
systems
A complete framework of DRM system for electronic documents contains not only
techniques for authenticating electronic and paper documents, but also techniques
for controlling the exchanging and sharing of documents among different users.
Interoperability and access control are the two major requirements in the imple-
mentation of the framework. Here we review some representative works done by
other researchers and companies regarding these topics.
2.3.1 Access control models and implementations
Computer systems provide access control to data and resources for reasons of
integrity and confidentiality. The fundamental model of access control is suggested
by Lampson in [Lam74], where the very nature of access suggests that there is an
active subject assessing a passive object with some specific access operations, while a





Figure 2.2: The fundamental model of access control
management system, access control enables controlled sharing and exchanging of
documents among users. Here the subjects are users and objects are documents.
On the most elementary level, the access operations for documents may contain
two types: observation and alteration. We review two most important access
control models and their implementations:
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Access control matrix (ACM)
In the following, we refer to
• a set S of subjects,
• a set O of objects,
• a set A of access operations.
The access control matrix model defines access rights in the form of a matrix
M = (Mso)s∈S,o∈O with Mso ⊂ A [Lam74]
The entry Mso specifies the set of access operations subject s may perform on
object o. The access control matrix could hardly be implemented directly because
otherwise the system must store a huge matrix that is very difficult for mainte-
nance. Instead, the system stores the access rights either with the subjects or with
the objects. In the first case, the access rights assigned to a subject constitute
the subject’s capability, and the corresponding access model is called capabilities
model. In the second case, an access control list (ACL) stores the access rights to
an object within the object itself, the corresponding model is called access control
list model.
Access control matrix has the following shortcomings:
• It is difficult to get an overview of who has the access rights to a given object
(for capabilities model), or what objects can a given subject access (for ACL
model). Such query generally requires enumerating all objects or subjects
to give an answer.
• For capabilities model, it is difficult to revoke a capability.
• For ACL model, it is difficult to revoke a subject’s access rights.
Access control matrix model allows the creator of an object to assign access
rights to other subjects. This is often referred to as the Discretionary Access
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Control (DAC). DAC is the basis of intellectual property protection, wherein the
author of a work automatically becomes the copyright owner of that work, and
is able to decide who others can access that work. DAC does not fit the security
needs for business and administrative transactions. It permits dishonest users
to disclose confidential information to others. What we need is a system-wide
policy decrees who is allowed to have access. Such access control policy is called
Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
Role-based access control (RBAC)
Because of the obvious shortcomings of ACM, people developed intermediate ac-
cess control models which use the concept of groups to group a set of subjects
together, and then assign access policies to the groups. Such models include
Groups and negative permissions, Protection rings, Privileges and Role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC) [Gol00]. We here focus on RBAC since it “addresses many
of the security needs of both the commercial and government sectors [NIS99]”.
In many organizations, the access control decisions are often determined based
on the employee functions, such as the specification of duties, responsibilities and
qualifications. RBAC mimics these decisions. A role can be thought of as a set
of procedures that a user or a set of users can perform in an organization. Here
the term procedure refers to the binding of specific access operations and objects.
In the context of RBAC literature, such procedures are called permissions. For
example, the role of tellers in a bank is to execute a savings deposit transaction,
requiring observation and alteration operations to the specific fields within a sav-
ings database. Here the permission is observation and alteration to the specific
fields in the database. Similarly, the role of a customer in a bank contains the
permission to observe the savings record owned by the customer himself. User
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assigned to a role derives the permissions of the role. A user can be assigned to
multiple roles, thus obtains the union of permissions contained by all roles. A
role can also have multiple users. Revocation of certain permissions from a user is
done by excluding the user from the corresponding roles. Through this way, RBAC
simplifies the management of access rights by introducing an intermediate layer
between S and A × O. The classification of roles and the assignment of users to
roles is done by the system administrator in compliance with organization-specific
protection guidelines [FK92]. It implements system-wide policy, so RBAC is an
instance of MAC.
There are many RBAC models proposed in the literature, among which the
NIST Standard RBAC Model [SFK00] has been proposed as a standard base for
other RBAC models. Main components of NIST RBAC model include users, roles,
role-hierarchy, permissions, user-role assignment and permission-role assignment.



















Figure 2.3: NIST RBAC model
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In this model, there are sets: U (Users), R (Roles), S (Sessions), P (Permis-
sions)
UA ⊆ U ×R: user-role assignment.
PA ⊆ P ×R: permission-role assignment.
RH ⊆ R×R: a partial order of role hierarchy.
user : S → U : a function mapping a session to a user.
roles : S → 2R: a function mapping a session to a set of activated roles.
permissions : R→ 2P : a function mapping a role to a set of assigned permissions:
permissions(r) = {p : P |(r, p) ∈ PA}
permissions∗ : R → 2P : a function mapping a role to a set of activated permis-
sions considering role hierarchy: permissions∗(r) = {p : P |∃ r′ ≤ r · (r′, p) ∈ PA}
There also exist some constraints in the constructions of UA, RH, PA and S
which are application specific. The basic constraints are the cardinality constraint
(controls the number of roles or users), the principle of least privilege constraint
(requires that a user be given no more privilege than necessary to perform a job)
and separation of duties constraint (no single individual be allowed to have all
permissions).
For a user u to successfully gain permission p, the following conditions must
be met:
1. ∃ s : S · user(s) = u, the user has started a session.
2. ar = roles(s) 6= ∅, the session contains a non-empty set of activated roles
ar.
3. p ∈ permissions(ar) or p ∈ permissions∗(ar), the desired permission p has
been assigned to the activated roles or the activated role hierarchy.
RBAC is the best candidate for the DRM system for electronic documents
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in business and administrative environment. This is because theoretically RBAC
provides a sound and verified background for solid access control, and practically
RBAC requires only minimum adjustments to the existing document management
workflow during implementation. However, there have been no existing standards
for the description and verification of RBAC policies. It is generally considered
that the use of XML as a platform-independent data exchange format to imple-
ment RBAC models is the best solution to achieve standardization. For example,
Ramaswamy in [Cha00] proposed the use of XML and associated APIs to con-
struct a RBAC framework. He developed an XML Document Type Definition
(DTD) for representing the RBAC model, which is capable of describing the user,
role and role hierarchy components. But Ramaswamy’s method stops at “describ-
ing” level. It does not support the enforcement of RBAC constraints. Another
recent effort in implementing RBAC model is done by the Organization for the
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS)1, who has set up an
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) technical committee for
developing XML-based frameworks and specification for access control. The next
version of XACML will include a set of RBAC profile which has not yet been fi-
nalized. The current working draft [And03] of XACML RBAC profile has defined
a set of elements and attributes for the description of RBAC roles, permissions,
SSD and DSD components. But it falls into the same pit of being able to “de-
scribe” only. A complete implementation of RBAC should support not only the
descriptions of all RBAC components, but also validations to the descriptions.
1http://www.oasis-open.org
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2.3.2 Rights expression languages
Rights expression language (REL) is used to describe the specific rights owned
by certain subjects over certain objects. It is closely related to the permission
component in RBAC model, except that REL also describes the prerequisites for
the subject to get the permission, such as making payments. A formal model of
rights expression languages is introduced by Gunter in [GWW01]. In this model,
the term rights is captured as a set of licenses. Each license is composed of several
realities, which are described as “rendering work w on device d at the time t
with payment x”. Gunter’s model is among the few theoretical works regarding
formal modeling of rights expression languages. The model is heavily bound to
the B2C electronic media distribution. It emphasizes on revenue model instead
of information confidentiality and integrity, hence not suitable for business or
administrative purpose.
More general purpose rights expression languages have been proposed by com-
panies who are developing proprietary systems. Most current languages use stan-
dard content formats such as XML to provide an extensible core set of semantics
and vocabulary. Among these languages, eXtensible rights Markup Language
(XrML) [Con02] and Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) [Ian00] have been
the most advanced which meet the MPEG-21 requirements [ISO01].
XrML
XrML [Con02] can be dated back to 1996, when Mark Stefik of Xerox’s Palo Alto
Research Center published his idea about a “trusted system” in [Ste96]. The pa-
per proposed that a trusted system would require machine-readable languages for
defining the access procedures. Stefik published his first rights management lan-
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guage Digital Property Rights Language (DPRL) using Lisp language, and later
changed to DPRL 2.0 using XML due to the requests from electronic publishing
community. After that, Xerox and Microsoft launched a company called Content-
Guard 2, who made further revision to DPRL 2.0 and renamed it to XrML.
The core element in XrML is grant, which contains principal, right, resource
and condition elements connected using the clause “grant principal the right to
access to the resource under conditions”. Version 2.0 of XrML has defined 24
different rights that can be conferred on content, and the number is still growing.
Although the language has been in existence for a few years, XrML is slow
to be adopted by DRM technology vendor. The main complaint is that XrML
appears to be too complex, making it difficult to implement, especially in those
Internet devices with low computational power and small memory footprints. An-
other complaint is that XrML standard is Microsoft-backed rather than an open
standard. In fact, Microsoft is the only vendor to date to ship products based on
XrML.
ODRL
Iannella of IPR System 3 thinks that XrML and other languages have “predom-
inately taken a closed approach to solving problems” [Ian00], and have “focused
on the content protection issues more than the rights management issues”. She
developed an entirely new XML-based rights management language named “Open
Digital Rights Language (ODRL)” in the spirit of open source software and pub-
lished it for use without restriction.




that encompasses a small set of core entities named assets, rights and parties.
The foundation model in ODRL can be expressed using offers and agreements.
Offers are proposals from rights holders (one entity of parties) for specific rights
over their assets. Agreements are when parties enter into contracts or deals with
specific offers. The model can also express revoking of any offers or agreements
[Ian02].
The competition among XrML and ODRL has not ended till today. XrML
was accepted by the ISO/IEC MPEG standards body for the developing MPEG-
21 media distribution standards, and ODRL was chosen by the Open Mobile
Alliance 4 (was the WAP Forum) as its rights language for all mobile content.
Both XrML and ODRL are designed to maximize the flexibility in rights de-
scription. Such flexibility is required for the diversified licensing models in digital
media marketing activities, for example, the subscription model and the pay-per-
view model. For business and administrative document management workflow, the
rights associated with each operator seldom change as long as the actual work-
flow has been implemented and put into daily use. It is somewhat overkill to
incorporate the entire XrML/ODRL specification into such cases.
Despite their flexibility, there are also some limitations preventing XrML/O-
DRL to be used for business and administrative documents:
1. Both XrML/ODRL identify the object being managed (resource in XrML or
asset in ODRL) using Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)5 or Digital Object
Identifier (DOI)6. Typical URI implementation, for example, the URL, can
only reference objects at the file level (e.g., http://foo.com/bar.html), or





identification method is not precise enough for business and administrative
documents. Consider an electronic contract document under negotiation, it
may have some parts marked “read-only” and other parts “open-to-change”.
Proper digital rights should be enforced down to arbitrary subparts inside a
document, or up to a collection of documents. XrML/ODRL yet does not
provide sufficient capabilities in this aspect.
2. The permission in XrML/ODRL is defined in a dictatorial way, that is to say,
the permission is defined statically. Such definition is applicable to digital
media distribution, because the targeted media file never changes after being
delivered. However, as long as business and administrative documents are
concerned, it is ofter the case that the user’s permission must depend on
the contents of the document. For example, the user shall not modify the
document if the document’s status is “final”. XrML/ODRL does not support
conditional permission definitions.
Nevertheless, sticking to an open standard facilitates information exchange and
rights enforcement among different parties. It is for this very reason that adopting
XrML/ODRL into access control framework is desired. But some extensions to
XrML/ODRL must be made to overcome their limitations regarding business and
administrative documents.
2.3.3 Framework of DRM system
The problem we’re addressing involves digital rights management for electronic
documents in business and administrative environment, with the ultimate goal
of building a complete framework of DRM system. We here review some existing
DRM systems built by companies and organizations who are in the DRM business.
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Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) workflow
Adobe PDF 7 is the de facto standard for distributing documents in digital form.
It is created to enable people view and print a file exactly as the author designed
it, without need to have the same authoring application, operation system or fonts
installed. PDF supports document authentication using digital signature schemes.
Start from version 1.1, PDF also provides some preliminary access control mech-
anisms in the form of several permissions. A recent version of PDF specification
defines 7 permissions as: [Ado01]
1. Modifying the document’s contents.
2. Copying or otherwise extract text and graphics from the document.
3. Adding or modifying text annotation and interactive form fields.
4. Printing the document.
5. Form fill-in and sign document.
6. Document assembly, including insertion, rotation, and deletion of pages and
creation of bookmarks and thumbnails.
7. Allow only printing that are limited to a low level representation of the
appearance, possibly of degraded quality.
Permission 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 apply to the access control during document deployment,
within which permission 1, 3, 5, 6 provide limited functionalities to document
creation in terms of form filling and content modification. Permission 4 and 7 are
related to printing process at end user’s site. A PDF document with any of the
permission assigned will be encrypted, internally using the RC4 symmetric key
encryption algorithm with MD5 hash of the user supplied password as the key.
We conclude the pros and cons of PDF format as follows:
7http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/
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• Since PDF format is designed for document viewing and printing. Being
platform neutral is the advantage of PDF format. But for the same reason,
developing platform independent PDF authoring tool is difficult. Existing
tools which create PDF file only convert other document format into PDF.
In this sense, PDF does not support direct data exchange and thus is not
suitable for document creation.
• PDF supports a set of access permissions which are sufficient for generic
office use. But the permissions and access control functions in PDF are
not flexible enough for business documents. Controlling the access rights to
arbitrary subparts inside a document is required. But PDF sets permissions
to the document as a whole.
• PDF also provides mechanisms to ensure the authenticity of the document
using encryption and digital signatures. The authentication information is
stored inside PDF file as a special record. As we have discussed before, the
authenticity information does not withstand format transcoding or conver-
sion.
• PDF supports printing control in three levels: printable, not printable and
printable in low quality. Such permissions are very useful in electronic pub-
lishing applications. For business document, the protection of originality is
sometimes more important. PDF format and Acrobat software do not of-
fer numbered printing control, nor can they prove the originality of printed
paper documents.
In summary, PDF offers an ideal platform for document description and pre-
sentation. Its preliminary support of permissions also meets the requirements for
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electronic publishing. But as far as business and administrative documents are
concerned, the lack of effective means for data exchange, flexible access control
and paper based originality assertion limits PDF’s application into the end user’s
site only (and for the sake of originality requirement, permission for printing doc-
uments must be disabled).
Electronic Business XML (ebXML)
Electronic Business XML (ebXML8) is one of the most prevalent business pro-
tocols and framework in business-to-business (B2B) integration. It is officially
established by OASIS and United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Elec-
tronic Business (UN/CEFACT). The goal of ebXML is to solve the interoperability
problem by enabling information sharing globally among companies of all sizes.
The ebXML specification consists of five components, namely, the Core Com-
ponent, the Business Process Specification Schema (BPSS), the Collaboration
Partner Profile (ebCPP), the Registry Service (ebRS), and the Messaging Ser-
vice (ebMS) [ebX03]. The security related services are implemented in BPSS and





• nonrepudiationOfOrigin (digitally signed message)
• nonrepudiationOfReceipt (digitally signed acknowledgment message)
• secureTransport (SSL, etc)
ebXML does not suggest which specific protocol should be used for these param-
8http://www.ebxml.org
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eters. It is left to be determined by trading partners. Nevertheless, ebXML spec-
ification strongly recommends open Internet standards. Table 2.3 show ebXML
recommended standards.
Authentication W3C/IETF XML Signature (XMLDSIG)
TLS, IPSEC
Confidentiality W3C/IETF XML Encryption (XMLENC)
S/MIME
Authorization SAML security credentials
TLS, IPSEC
Non-repudiation of message ori-
gin and content
A duty on each party to save copies of all
business documents and document envelopes
comprising the transaction.
Non-repudiation of receipt The responder is required to send a signed
copy of the receipt, which the requester then
saves.
Table 2.3: ebXML recommended security protocol
We conclude the pros and cons of ebXML as follows:
• ebXML represents the trend of global e-commerce integration. It provides
a framework that enables communication between systems in a way that is
independent of individual system technologies, architectures and application
domains. Adoption of ebXML shall fundamentally solve the interoperability
problem. However, “global adoption” seems to be too optimistic at least for
now.
• The security of ebXML emphasizes more on communication security than
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rights management. It specifies a set of protocols to establish a secure chan-
nel between two parties, but does not tell how to manage the data transmit-
ted inside the channel. For example, ebXML does not tell the recipient his
rights to use the data received.
• The existence of paper documents has been excluded from ebXML speci-
fication, neither does other paginated electronic documents such as PDF.
Though finally it shall be possible to conduct business transaction purely
electronically, for the current stage the support of paper documents cannot
be ignored.
In summary, ebXML offers an ideal platform for multi-party interoperation.
But the lack of rights management support has limited its application to document
creation and deployment only. Concrete measures should be taken to make ebXML
interface with “legacy” document based back-end systems.
2.3.4 Discussion
In the previous discussion, we have identified that the interoperability and security
of DRM system can be achieved using interchangeable XML document format and
role-based access control. Key technologies involved in the DRM system include
access control, rights expression language, and the integrated document manage-
ment framework that manages rights from XML document till paper document.
Although these technologies have more or less been studied and developed, they
are facing unique challenges when put into business and administrative documents
domain. These challenges contain both research and implementation issues, which
can be mainly captured as end-to-end document authentication and integrated ac-
cess control. Without solving these two chanllenges the DRM system for electronic
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documents is far from complete.
2.4 Our work
The second generation DRM requires a complete and end-to-end framework for
managing electronic documents. Previous works pose some difficulties in such a
framework, especially in the aspect of end-to-end document authentication and
integrated access control. Our work in fact addresses these problems directly.
We propose authentication methods for electronic documents and printed docu-
ments with special consideration of document format transcoding and originality
assertion. These two methods are linked together to provide end-to-end document
authentication. We also propose a role-based access control framework using XML
technologies. The access control framework can be integrated with the authen-
tication methods to give total protection over electronic documents, from their




In this chapter, we present a watermark scheme and authentication method for
electronic documents. The prominent feature which distinguishes our authenti-
cation method from traditional digital signature based methods is that we use
content-based watermark to embed the authentication information into the doc-
ument such that the information becomes an inseparable part of the document.
Our method also withstands document format transcoding. It is intended to solve
the authenticity and interoperability problems we raised in Chapter 1.
3.1 Introduction
In business and administrative document exchange, maintaining the authenticity
of the documents is vital to the establishment of trusted relationship among all
parties. Unlike traditional cryptographic point of view that authenticity applies
to the binary representation of the message, DRM system demands authenticity
assertion to the content of the message. This is because different parties may
have different computer systems running different document processing software
packages. What should be authenticated is the content of the message, not the
44
specific document format or appearance the document takes.
Another challenge arises in document exchange is that the access rights regard-
ing to a specific document must be maintained across different document formats.
These document formats may support rights description natively (e.g., PDF), or
do not support at all (e.g. PostScript). For the later case, there must exist some
methods to attach rights description with the document during document delivery
so that the receiver can have access to these rights.
As discussed in Section 2.1, authentication of electronic documents requires the
combination of two techniques: the content-based authenticator and the document
watermark scheme. We have established that the content-based authenticator
can be generated using cryptographic hash or digital signature onto the critical
contents of the document. A typical hash value or digital signature is a binary
string of several tens to hundreds bits long. The watermark scheme used to hide
this value must provide enough information carrying capacity. We also consider
using the same watermark scheme to embed rights description into the document
because it would be convenient for both document handling as well as interfacing
with legacy systems. Obviously the addition of rights description data rises further
demands on the information carrying capacity, typically with several hundreds
more bits. In what follows, we propose a watermark scheme which satisfies this
requirement, and present an effective document authentication method.
The application of the watermark scheme and authentication method in doc-
ument delivery is shown in Figure 3.1. Given a document for protection and the
corresponding rights description (co-created by the authors and system policy), we
use document watermark scheme to embed the rights description into the docu-



















Figure 3.1: Application of watermark scheme in document management
description, and embed the authenticator again into watermarked document for
delivery. On the receiving side, the receiver verifies if the delivered document is
authentic using the verifier published by the sender, and extract the rights descrip-
tion from the document for execution. The receiver can also send the document to
next recipient if it is required and allowed by the rights description, using the same
procedures in Figure 3.1. With this structure, rights applicable to the document
is transferred from the author to the end user, and the security of the document
is protected in the workflow.
3.2 Render Sequence Encoding (RSE)
3.2.1 Motivation
The major obstacle for existing document watermark schemes to be used for au-
thentication and rights description purpose is their low information carrying ca-
pacity. Before going on, we first consider the process that an electronic document
is read and understood by human cognitive system. It is a three-stage process:
the first stage is the rendering stage, when electronic document is converted into
readable images by the computer’s rendering system. The readable images are ei-
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ther displayed on computer screen, or printed onto paper. Following the rendering
stage is the vision stage. It is the process that the images are captured by human
visual system. The captured images are finally analyzed by the human brain and
get understood in the understanding stage. Each stage in the process contains cer-
tain level of variance-tolerance. For example, small variances in rendered images
will not affect the output of human visual system, and small variances in wording
of sentences will not affect understanding. From information theory point of view,
the variance-tolerance ability predicates the existence of redundant information in
the document. By replacing the redundant information with payload data or their
derivations, watermark scheme achieves information embedding, and the amount
of redundant information directly determines the information carrying capacity of
that watermark scheme.
Now let’s look at the existing document watermark schemes we discussed ear-
lier in Section 2.1.2. Obviously, layout and appearance watermark schemes are at
the vision stage. They create small variations in document images in such a way
that human visual system cannot discover them. Text watermark schemes are at
the understanding stage. They create different sentences, which yield the same
meaning after analyzed by the speech center in human brain. It is interesting to
note that the farther the watermark scheme is away from the understanding stage,
the more information carrying capacity it owns. This is because of the accumula-
tion of variance-tolerances throughout different stages, and hence provides more
redundancies, as shown in Figure 3.2.
Apparently, something missing from the existing document watermark schemes
is a scheme positioned at the rendering stage. Figure 3.2 tells us that such a scheme









Figure 3.2: Cognition process and watermark schemes
In the next section, we propose Render Sequence Encoding to fill this vacancy.
3.2.2 Basis of RSE
Unlike other document watermark schemes which embed payload data into pure
text documents or image-based documents, RSE embeds data into formatted doc-
uments. Formatted document refers to the document format which contains both
text data and layout information. It is also called vector-based document for-
mat somewhere to be distinguished from image-based document formats. Strictly
speaking, use of the word “vector” here is not precise, because in formatted doc-
uments texts are described using font definitions and glyph indexes, while in vec-
tor documents they are described using outlines. Formatted document combines
the advantages of both text documents and image-based documents: the small
file size and platform independent page layout. It is widely used in document
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exchange. Some frequent formatted document formats include PostScript (PS),
Portable Document Format (PDF), Printer Control Language (PCL), Device In-
dependent Document (DVI), etc.
In formatted documents, text data are described using 3-tuples of (charac-
ter, font, position). For example, Figure 3.3 is a simple document which uses
PostScript language to describe the sentence “This is a sentence.” The first
1 /Times -Roman findfont % Font
2 12 scalefont % Font
3 setfont % Font
4 newpath
5 120 700 moveto % Positioning
6 (This is a sentence .) show % Characters
7 showpage
Figure 3.3: A simple PostScript document
three lines select 12 point Times-Roman font, line 5 moves the cursor to the tar-
get position, and line 6 draws the character string. Note that there is only one
positioning command “120 700 moveto”, which defines the position of the first
character “T”. All following characters are advanced horizontally according to the
character width stored in the font definition. The description of the 3-tuple are
very clear and succinct. However, such simple formatting methods are rarely used
practically. Word processing software packages usually issue several positioning
commands for a single text line, in order to satisfy the requirements on text jus-
tification and font kerning (adjustment of space between pairs of letters to make
them more visually appealing). For example, the above sentence is formatted
as Figure 3.4 by the LATEX document preparation system (we have expanded all
PostScript macros to make the code more readable). In this real sample, the sen-
tence has been split into five code segments (line 5–6, 7–8, 9–10, 11–12, 13–14),
each consists of a positioning command and a drawing command. Examining the
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1 /Times -Roman findfont % Font
2 12 scalefont % Font
3 setfont % Font
4 newpath
5 120.5 700.0 moveto % Positioning
6 (This) show % Characters
7 147.1 700.0 moveto % Positioning
8 (is) show % Characters
9 159.0 700.0 moveto % Positioning
10 (a) show % Characters
11 168.7 700.0 moveto % Positioning
12 (sen) show % Characters
13 184.6 700.0 moveto % Positioning
14 (tence.) show % Characters
15 showpage
Figure 3.4: A PostScript document with explicit positioning commands
five positioning commands, we can find that the position parameters they take are
sorted in normal reading direction, that is, from left to right. We now randomly
permute the five segments so that the position parameters are no longer sorted,
as shown in Figure 3.5. Obviously, Figure 3.5 has exactly the same appearance
1 /Times -Roman findfont % Font
2 12 scalefont % Font
3 setfont % Font
4 newpath
5 168.7 700.0 moveto % Positioning
6 (sen) show % Characters
7 184.6 700.0 moveto % Positioning
8 (tence.) show % Characters
9 147.1 700.0 moveto % Positioning
10 (is) show % Characters
11 120.5 700.0 moveto % Positioning
12 (This) show % Characters
13 159.0 700.0 moveto % Positioning
14 (a) show % Characters
15 showpage
Figure 3.5: A randomly permuted Postscript document
as Figure 3.4 after being rendered, but in binary level they are different ones.
In fact we can create up to 5! = 120 visually same documents by using differ-
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ent permutations in the permuting of the five segments. From variance-tolerance
perspective, the variant permutations among all documents are tolerable by the
computer’s rendering system. This predicates the existence of redundancies in
document description. The particular form that redundant information takes here
is the sequence of positioning and corresponding drawing commands.
When a formatted document is rendered either on the computer screen or
on the printer, the rendering system will sequentially parse and execute all com-
mands in the document, rather than sort all commands first and execute them
as a whole. This is because otherwise the rendering system must spool a lot of
commands, parse them once to determine an optimal sort order, then parse them
for the second time to generate the output. Such a process will be very memory
and time consuming. So typical rendering systems can preserve the permuted se-
quence of positioning and drawing commands. For example, when a document as
Figure 3.5 is being rendered, the word “sen” shows up first, followed by “tence.”,
“is”, “This” and “a”. The render sequence no longer follows the normal reading
direction. Thus we name our watermark scheme the Render Sequence Encoding.
Generating a unique permutation of render sequence based on the payload data
form the basis of RSE scheme.
To create more redundancies as well as to facilitate encoding and decoding
efficiency, the permutation of positioning commands can be applied to characters
instead of words, e.g., permuting the positions of all character “e”s in a whole
page. We call the character being permuted the permutation target.
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3.2.3 Implementation of RSE
In this section we present the RSE watermark scheme by discussing its encoding
and decoding algorithms, information carrying capacity, and robustness against
format transcoding.
Encoding algorithm
RSE embeds information into electronic document by permuting the render se-
quence according to a certain permutation. The encoding algorithm generates
such a permutation based on the payload data. Two problems to be tackled are:
1. how to identify a permutation. 2. how to map payload data to the identification
of a permutation.
An obvious method (called normal notation hereinafter) to identify a permu-
tation is to list the occurrence of each element directly, for example, the notation
{3, 4, 1, 5, 2} means element 3 is permuted to the first place while 2 to the last.
However, there is significant dependence in the choice of each element. Once an
element had been used, it cannot appear in the following sequence again. This
issue creates some difficulties in enumerating all permutations if the number of
elements is large. A workaround is to find a way to list all permutations sequen-
tially, so that we can identify each permutation using its index. Algorithm for
generating all permutations sequentially based on normal notation was discov-
ered by Johnson [Joh63] and Trotter [Tro62] independently, and was described by
Gardner in [Gar74]. The algorithm is quite simple, but in order to determine the
i-th permutation, all i − 1 permutations must be generated first, which will be
time consuming for large permutation length, hence unacceptable either.
Here we use another method called inversion notation to identify a permuta-
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tion, and introduce a fast algorithm to map arbitrary payload data to an inversion
notation. Describing a permutation by means of its inversion notation was dis-
covered by Hall [MH63]:
Definition 3.2.1
Let {i1, i2, . . . , in} be a normal notation of a permutation in the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The pair (ij, ik) is called an inversion if j < k and ij > ik.
For example, the permutation {3, 4, 1, 5, 2} has five inversions: (3, 1), (3, 2),
(4, 1), (4, 2) and (5, 2).
Definition 3.2.2
For a permutation {i1, i2, . . . , in}, let aj denote the number of inversions whose
second component is j. In other words, aj equals to the number of integers which
precede j in the permutation but are large than j; it measures how much j is out
of order.
The sequence of numbers {a1, a2, . . . , an} is called the inversion sequence of the
permutation {i1, i2, . . . , in}.
For example, the inversion sequence for permutation {3, 4, 1, 5, 2} is {2, 3, 0, 0, 0}.
Theorem 3.2.1
Inversion sequence {a1, a2, . . . , an} of the permutation {i1, i2, . . . , in} satisfies this
condition:
0 ≤ a1 ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ a2 ≤ n− 2, . . . , 0 ≤ an−1 ≤ 1, an = 0.
This is so because for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n there are n− k integers in the set
{1, 2, . . . , n} which are larger than k. Brualdi in [Bru99] shows the mapping be-
tween normal notation and inversion notation is onto, and gives conversion algo-
rithms between these two notations. The advantage of using inversion notation is
that we can choose each element in an inversion sequence independently, as long
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as Theorem 3.2.1 is satisfied.
Procedures for mapping arbitrary payload data into inversion sequence are:
Algorithm 3.2.1 (Encoding algorithm)
For any integer X,
1. Choose an appropriate number n such that n! > X.
2. Calculate:
a1 = X ÷ (n− 1)! X1 = X − a1 × (n− 1)!
a2 = X1 ÷ (n− 2)! X2 = X1 − a2 × (n− 2)!
...
...
ak = Xk−1 ÷ (n− k)! Xk = Xk−1 − ak × (n− k)!
...
...
an−1 = Xn−2 Xn−1 = Xn−2 − an−1 = 0
an = Xn−1 = 0
(3.1)
where a÷ b = ba/bc, the integer part of (a/b).
3. The sequence {a1, a2, . . . , an} is the inversion sequence identified by data X.
Proof. of encoding algorithm
It holds without saying that a1 . . . an ≥ 0.
From step (1) and (2) of Algorithm 3.2.1, we have:
a1 = X ÷ (n− 1)!, and X < n!, so
a1 < n!÷ (n− 1)! = n ⇒ a1 ≤ (n− 1)
(3.2)
Now consider X1 = X − a1 × (n− 1)!, it means X1 is the remainder of X divided
by (n− 1)!, therefore
X1 < (n− 1)! (3.3)
From 3.2 and 3.3, we get a2 = X1÷ (n−2)! ≤ (n−2). It follows that a3 ≤ (n−3)
54
till an ≤ (n − n) = 0. So the outcome of Algorithm 3.2.1 is a valid inversion
sequence.
We also claim that for each X, there exists only one corresponding inversion
sequence (Encoding uniqueness). To prove this, we need the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2.1
Given any integer k > 0,
k! = (k − 1)!× (k − 1) + (k − 2)!× (k − 2) + · · ·+ 2!× 2 + 1!× 1 + 0!× 0 + 1
Proof.
k!− (k − 1)!× (k − 1)− (k − 2)!× (k − 2)− · · · − 1!× 1− 0!× 0
= (k − 1)!× (k − k + 1)− (k − 2)!× (k − 2)− · · · − 1!× 1− 0!× 0
= (k − 1)!− (k − 2)!× (k − 2)− · · · − 1!× 1− 0!× 0
= (k − 2)!− (k − 3)!× (k − 3)− · · · − 1!× 1− 0!× 0
...
= 1!× 1− 0!× 0
= 1
Proof. of encoding uniqueness
Suppose, on the contrary, there exist two distinct inversion sequences {a1, a2, . . . , an}
and {b1, b2, . . . , bn} such that:
X = a1 × (n− 1)! + a2 × (n− 2)! + · · ·+ an−1 + an
and X = b1 × (n− 1)! + b2 × (n− 2)! + · · ·+ bn−1 + bn
we have:
a1 × (n− 1)! + a2 × (n− 2)! + · · ·+ an−1 + an =
b1 × (n− 1)! + b2 × (n− 2)! + · · ·+ bn−1 + bn
(3.4)
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Assume a1 6= b1 and not losing generality, assume a1 > b1, then
(a1 − b1)× (n− 1)! = (b2 − a2)× (n− 2)! + . . .+ (bn−1 − an−1) + (bn − an),
(n− 1)! = b2 − a2
a1 − b1 × (n− 2)! + . . .+
bn−1 − an−1




Since 0 ≤ a2 ≤ n− 2 and 0 ≤ b2 ≤ n− 2,
b2 − a2 ≤ n− 2
Notice a1 − b1 ≥ 1, so
b2 − a2
a1 − b1 ≤ n− 2
It also holds for
b3 − a3
a1 − b1 ≤ n− 3
...
bk − ak
a1 − b1 ≤ n− k
...
bn−1 − an−1
a1 − b1 ≤ 1
bn − an
a1 − b1 = 0
Obviously Equation 3.5 contradicts with Proposition 3.2.1 because each corre-
sponding addend in Equation 3.5 is less than or equal to the one in Proposi-
tion 3.2.1, but the last item +1 is missing. So there must exist a1 = b1.
Then we cancel a1 × (n − 1)! and b1 × (n − 1)! from both sides of Equation 3.4
and repeat the above steps. The result will be a2 = b2 · · · till an = bn.
By now we have solved the two problems raised at the beginning of this section:
1. a permutation can be uniquely identified using its inversion sequence. 2. the
encoding algorithm can uniquely map payload data to an inversion sequence.
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We give an example of Render Sequence Encoding to end the introduction of
encoding algorithm. In this example, we embed string “GNU” into the “Pream-
ble” section of the “GNU General Public License” 1. The ASCII coding for the
string “GNU” is 0x474E55, or decimal 4673109. We choose n = 11 so that
n! = 39916800 > 4673109. By applying Algorithm 3.2.1, we get the inversion
sequence of the desired permutation as {1, 2, 7, 7, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 0}. The permuta-
tion can be illustrated as Figure 3.6 (using the algorithm introduced in [Bru99]).
Original Sequence
Permuted Sequence
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
4381076925111
21
Figure 3.6: Sample permutation {1,2,7,7,1,2,2,3,1,1,0}
We choose character “e” as the permutation target. There are altogether 47
“e”s is the document, our permutation only needs 11 for one round of encoding,
so we can do 4 rounds in this paragraph.
The encoding process is done by permuting the position of each character “e”
according to the permutation shown in Figure 3.6, that is, the position of the 1st
character “e” in the encoded document is actually the position of the 2nd “e” in
the original document, that of the 2nd’s is the 4th in the original document, and
so on. For illustrative purpose, we label the order of the occurrence of each “e”
in the encoded document, as shown in Figure 3.7. The number “1” below the 1st
“e” in the word “license” means this “e” is the 1st “e” to appear, followed by
1http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
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the last “e” in the word “software”, so on so forth.
  e    e  e                 e   e  e    e        e       
  
  ee           e          e                     e      e e          
   e  e       e  e            ee        ee           e          e   ee
       e        e    e   e        e      ee               e     
 e e              e  e      e               e   ee        e
                    e               e              e 
Th lic ns for most softwar ar d sign d to tak away your
1    1  5                 2   9  6    7        1
  1                                              0
fr  dom to shar and chang it. By contrast, th GNU G n ral Public
  83           4          2                     1      1 1
                          2                     2      6 3           
Lic ns is int nd d to guarant  your fr  dom to shar and chang fr  
   2  1       1  2            11        13           2          2   23
   0  7       8  1            94        53           3          7   41
softwar --to mak sur th softwar is fr  for all its us rs. This
       2        2    3   3        2      24               3
       8        9    2   0        5      64               4        
G n ral Public Lic ns appli s to most of th Fr  Softwar 
 3 3              4  3      4               4   43        3
 8 5              2  9      0               3   16        7 
Foundation's softwar and to any oth r program whos authors commit to
                    4               4              4 
                    5               6              7
using it.
Figure 3.7: Sample encoded document
Decoding algorithm
To decoding a RSE encoded document, we must first extract the permutation
from the document, then decode the permutation to recover the payload X. The
procedures are:
Algorithm 3.2.2 (Decoding algorithm)
Given any RSE encoded document, do the following steps:
1. If the permutation target and permutation length n is known, go to step 6,
otherwise go to step 2.
2. Find the permutation target by examine the positioning commands for each
character.
3. Record all the positions for the permutation target and discover the render
sequence. It is done by comparing the physical storage order of these po-
sitions with the logical positions they represent. The sequence is denoted
{S1, S2, . . . , Sm}.
4. Generate a new sequence S ′ such that S ′k = Sk+1 − Sk.
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5. Find the largest period of the sequence S ′, it is the permutation length n.
6. Discover the actual render sequence {a1, a2, . . . , an} with the permutation
target and the permutation length n.




ai × (n− i)! (3.6)
Equation 3.6 holds because it is just the reverse form of Equation 3.1.
It must specially noted that in order to carry out steps 2–5 to determine the
permutation target and length, several prerequisites must be satisfied, including:
1. The decoder must know how to distinguish permutation targets, though it may
not know which exact permutation target is used. For example, it is possible
to permute character “e” to encode one message, and permute character “a” to
encode another. Then the decoder must know that the permutation target contains
one single character. 2. The permutation used must not contain repeatable “sub-
permutations”. For example, the permutation {3,1,2,6,4,5} (normal notation) is
not allowed, because it will confuse the detector in finding the largest period in step
5. These two prerequisites especially the second one forces some limitations on the
RSE scheme. However, for authentication purpose the permutation target and the
permutation length can be made public, transferred through auxiliary channels,
or pre-agreed between the encoder and the decoder. Publicizing this information
does not prevent the RSE scheme to be a public watermark scheme, because they
contain no information about the original document. Nevertheless, steps 2–5 can
still be used as back-up mechanisms in case the extraction of permutation target
and length is needed. We continue the RSE encoding example to see how the
encoded information is decoded.
We first determine the permutation target is character “e” because its posi-
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tions are in abnormal order. By comparing the storage order of the positioning
commands with the positions they represent, we get:
{S1, S2, . . . , S47} = {11, 1, 5, 2, 9, 6, 7, 10, 8, 3, 4, . . . , 36, 37, 45, 46, 47}
and by step 4, we get:
{S ′1, S ′2, . . . , S ′46} =
{10,−4, 3,−7, 3,−1,−3, 2, 5,−1,−18,
10,−4, 3,−7, 3,−1,−3, 2, 5,−1,−18,
10,−4, 3,−7, 3,−1,−3, 2, 5,−1,−18,
10,−4, 3,−7, 3,−1,−3, 2, 5,−1,−8,
− 1,−1}
The largest period of the sequence S ′ is 11, so the encoding is on an 11-permutation
(Note that the last two lines of S ′ are exceptions, because encoding had been
truncated). We then obtain the real permutation by examine the first 11 “e”s,
which is:
{11, 1, 5, 2, 9, 6, 7, 10, 8, 3, 4},
and the corresponding inversion sequence is:
{a1, a2, . . . , an} = {1, 2, 7, 7, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 0}.




ai × (n− i)! = 4673109.
Thus, the encoded string is decoded as “GNU”.
Information carrying capacity
RSE is based on the permutation of render sequence. The length of the permu-
tation determines how many different permutations can be generated, and hence
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determines the information carrying capacity. For a page of document containing
n permutation targets, the maximum length of permutation is n, and the max-
imum number of permutations can be generate is n! (n’s factorial). This is a
number quite enormous even if n is only moderately large. For example, 15! is
more than 1, 000, 000, 000, 000.
The number of bits that can be encoded using n-permutation is:
Nbits = blog2 n!c








where pi = 3.141 . . . and e = 2.718 . . . is the base of natural logarithm, we get:
Nbits ∼
⌊





The relationship between the number of permutation targets and the maximum
encoded bits is shown in Figure 3.8. The fist page of this chapter contains 106

















Figure 3.8: Permutation Targets vs. Encoded Bits
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“e”s, which means a payload of 560 bits long can be embedded. It is 57 times
large than using Brassil’s line shift encoding scheme.
It is expected that, by adding positioning commands into the original docu-
ment, the file size will be increased. We use experiments to show the effect of
size increase versus the number of permutation targets. This experiment takes
a page of pure text data as input, outputs two PostScript documents, one un-
encoded, and the other encoded with selectable permutation targets. We choose
up to 10 most frequently used characters in the original text as the permutation
targets (in the experiment, {e, t, o, r, i, a, s, n, h, u}). Table 3.1 shows the
relationship among the choice of permutation targets, the number of permuta-
tion targets, the encoded bits and the file size in “ps.bz2 (PostScript with bzip2
compression)” format. We find the addition of permutation targets dramatically
increases the information carrying capacity of RSE, but the enlargement of file
size is comparatively smaller.
3.2.4 Robustness
An important requirement on the watermark scheme for authentication purpose
is the robustness against document format transcoding. This property helps to
ensure document security in an interoperable environment. We use experiments
to show RSE scheme satisfies this requirement.
In the experiment setup, we create a virtual printer driver which stores the
position of printed characters into local file instead of printing onto real printer.
The printer driver is programmed as a Ghostscript 2 device, and servers as the




Choice of Number of Number of File size
Permutation targets Permutation targets encoded bits (ps.bz2)
{ø} 0 0 1701
{e} 284 1910 3121
{e,t} 511 3866 4026
{e,t,o} 710 5706 4756
{e,t,o,r} 883 7373 5144
{e,...,i} 1037 8899 5601
{e,...,a} 1187 10416 5947
{e,...,s} 1338 11972 5844
{e,...,n} 1466 13310 6082
{e,...,h} 1555 14250 6198
{e,...,u} 1628 15026 6271
Table 3.1: File size & Encoded bits vs. Permuted characters
formats other than Postscript are converted into Postscript, and the permuted
render sequence is captured at the virtual printer driver.
The encoded source document is in Postscript format. We convert it into
PDF format (using ps2pdf13 and Adobe Distiller respectively), PCL format (using
ljet4 with Ghostscript), PCLXL format (through a HP Windows printer driver)
and EPS format (using epswrite with Ghostscript). We then send the converted
files info CUPS system and examine the layout of permutation targets. We have
performed the same experiments for 50 different encoded source file with distinct
permutation targets. All of them preserve the render sequence successfully.
In another experiment, we create an encoded Postscript document, edit it us-
ing Adobe Illustrator by changing several characters, then save back to a PDF file.
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When the edited PDF file gets printed, we discover that the encoded information
at the places where changes are made has been destroyed, while the encoded in-
formation at the unchanged places is preserved perfectly. This property shows the
fragility of RSE against modifications. It enables a tamper detection application
without resort to the original version. We’ll discuss it the next section.
3.2.5 Discussion
We have proposed a watermark scheme named RSE for electronic documents.
The scheme features large information carrying capacity and robustness against
document format transcoding. These two favorable properties enable RSE to be
used in the document management system as discussed in Section 3.1.
RSE watermark scheme is invisible watermark scheme. The word “invisible”
here means “strictly invisible”. It is different from the traditional “invisible” wa-
termark schemes wherein the “invisible” actually means “unnoticeable”. Because
of so, it is possible to incorporate other document watermark schemes into RSE to
achieve more information carrying capacity. For example, all layout and appear-
ance watermark schemes can be implemented using RSE by slightly modifying
the positions or adding some extra drawing commands, and all text watermark
schemes can be done by modifying the characters.
RSE watermark scheme is public watermark scheme, which means the ex-
traction of embedded payload data does not need the original unwatermarked
document. However, for efficiency and accuracy consideration, it is better for the
encoder and the decoder to make pre-agreement on the permutation targets and
length. Whether this information can be made public or not depends on whether
the verification is to be done publicly or privately.
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3.3 Document authentication
We have proposed Render Sequence Encoding as a solution to the embedding
problem. RSE provides enough information carrying capacity to embed rights
description for the document as well as other auxiliary data. In this section, we
solve the authenticator problem, and propose an efficient document authentica-
tion method which integrates with the RSE scheme to protect embedded rights
description and document contents.
How to design content-based authenticator for electronic documents is a well
studied topic in cryptographic literature through the use of digital signature
schemes [MvOV97]. A simple content-based authentication method for electronic
document can be designed as:
1. Generate authentic document:
(a) Extract all text contents or certain critical text contents from the doc-
ument.
(b) Generate digital signature for the contents.
(c) Embed the digital signature into the document using RSE scheme.
2. Verify document:
(a) Extract the embedded digital signature from the document.
(b) Extract the same contents from the document as in the generating
procedure document.
(c) Verify the extracted contents with the digital signature.
Here digital signature has been used as the authenticator in Figure 2.1. This
method seems applicable but practically it gets some problems. The most signifi-
cant one is still RSE’s information carrying capacity. As one example, the widely
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adopted “Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 4” which uses the DSA signature
scheme with 1024-bit secret key will produce two 160-bit strings as the signature.
This 320-bit signature contains only numerical values. It must be attached with
the signer’s identification for the verifier to access the signer’s public information.
A typical implementation of DSS such as the GnuPG 5 program produces stan-
dard DSS signature as long as 520 bits. Encoding a 520-bit digital signature into
a page of ordinary document is not difficult for RSE watermark scheme (see Fig-
ure 3.1). But at the presence of rights descriptions and other auxiliary data, it
would be too much for RSE watermark especially when the document is short. A
authentication method with short authenticator length is hence needed.
The reason why most existing digital signature schemes produce long signa-
tures is that they are based on the security of cryptosystems built on top of the
hardness of number theory problems. Examples of these problems include the fac-
torization of integers and the discrete logarithm. These problems use operations
over integers from hundreds to thousands of bits to prevent exhaustive search at-
tacks, so the output is among that range also. Other drawbacks of using these
problems include the facts that the hardness of these problems is not proved (so
efficient algorithms and computers may threaten them), and the arithmetic op-
erations are very expensive (modular multiplications, modular exponentiations,
etc). Since 1989, there have been several attempts to build cryptosystems based
on the NP-complete problems which use operations over small numbers or even
bits. The results include the Permuted Kernels Problem (PKP) [Sha90, PC94],
the Syndrome Decoding (SD) [Ste94], the Perceptron Problem (PP) [Poi95], the




Problem (XTSP) [Luc94, Luc95]. Most of these schemes have been proposed on
the zero-knowledge interactive proof background without touching the authentica-
tion requirements. Here we propose an authentication method based on XTSP. We
first explore the hardness of XTSP, and then present the authentication method.
3.3.1 Mathematical background
TSP and XTSP
The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) is one of the most widely studied combi-
natorial optimization problems. The definition of TSP is:
Definition 3.3.1
Let G define a graph (V,E) where V is a set of vertices, and E is a set of edges
between members of V . For each edge e ∈ E, c(e) gives the cost for that edge and
C = (ci,j) is the cost matrix associated with E. The TSP problem is to find a tour
T which visits each vertex once and only once (formally a Hamiltonian cycle) in
G, with the lowest total cost.
The most common practical interpretation of the TSP is that of a salesman
seeking the shortest tour through n cities. TSP contains some special cases: if
ci,j = cj,i for all i, j ∈ V , the problem is called symmetrical TSP, otherwise asym-
metrical TSP; if ci,j + cj,k ≥ ci,k for all i, j ∈ V , C is said to satisfy the triangle
inequality and the problem is called Euclidean TSP. The proof of NP-completeness
of TSP can be found in [CLRS01, LLKS85]. Compared with other NP-complete
problems, TSP is among the oldest ones and has been studied long before the
theory of NP-completeness was developed. Although not provable, the hardness
of TSP is backed by decades of research.
The Exact TSP is a variation of TSP:
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Definition 3.3.2
Let G define a graph (V,E) where V is a set of vertices, and E is a set of edges
between members of V . The XTSP problem is to find a tour T which visits each
vertex once and only once in G, with the total cost equals to a given cost L.
The major difference between TSP and XTSP is that XTSP asks for a tour
with exact total cost instead of the lowest cost. The NP-Completeness of XTSP
has been proved by Stefan Lucks in [Luc94]. In the following, we review some
existing TSP algorithms to see whether they also apply to XTSP.
Algorithms for TSP
TSP is perhaps the most well known combinatorial optimization problem. Its
simple definition along with its notorious difficulty has stimulated (and still stim-
ulates) many efforts to find an efficient algorithm [Pun02]. Due to the NP-complete
nature of TSP, only approximate algorithms can be expected. We here review two
major approaches: the heuristic algorithms and the exact algorithms.
Heuristic algorithms. Heuristic algorithms for TSP do not aim to find the
lowest cost tour but a tour that is reasonably low cost. The algorithms have
been following two streams: one stream emphasizes on guaranteed worst-case
performance, and the other emphasizes on good empirical performance.
The heuristic with guaranteed worst-case performance works on symmetrical
TSP with the cost matrix C satisfies triangle inequality. It usually starts with
the minimum spanning tree S of graph G [AHU74], then create a tour T which
shares as many edges as possible with S. The best result so far is given in [Chr76],
where the total tour cost is guaranteed to be less than 1.5 times of the cost of the
minimum spanning tree. The algorithm has polynomial time complexity. But it
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should be mentioned that no heuristic with a guaranteed worst-case performance
is known for the asymmetrical TSP, or symmetrical TSP which is not Euclidean.
The heuristics with good empirical performance can be classify into tour con-
struction heuristic which gradually builds a solution by adding a new vertex at
each step, and tour improvement heuristic which improve a feasible solution by
various exchanges. There also has been composite heuristic which combines the
tour construction heuristic and tour improvement heuristic together. For a good
review about these algorithms, please refer to [Lap92]. The heuristic with good
empirical performance works for both symmetrical and asymmetrical TSP. How-
ever, the algorithm has exponential complexity. It can be proved that if the cost
matrix C does not satisfy the triangle inequality, good approximate tours cannot
be found in polynomial time unless P = NP [CLRS01].
The core of heuristic algorithms is the iterative loop of optimizations. For each
iteration of optimization, the algorithm determines a better edge to be inserted
into the tour, or a worse edge to be removed from the tour, until the final tour
is reasonably good. Different algorithms have different criteria for making the
choices, but from statistical point of view, they are all trying to maximize the
probability that an inserted edge is in the final optimal tour and a removed edge
is not in the final optimal tour. The cost and the connectivity of edges give great
hints on the estimation of the probability, for example, edges with lower cost and
edges close to the convex hull of all vertices gain more points [Rei94].
Now consider the XTSP case. We argue that heuristic algorithms cannot solve
XTSP. This is because:
1. Heuristic algorithms only find approximate solutions, not exact solutions.
2. The cost of each edge gives no hint on whether the total cost will equal
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to the given cost L or not. Without the hint, optimization is pointless.
However, exception should be made if the given cost value L is very large or
small, or the cost of ci,j has a significant uneven distribution. Under such
circumstance, it is possible to determine several vertices in the solution,
thus reduces the size of the problem. So in order to improve the hardness of
XTSP, ci,j should have uniform distribution, and L should be appropriate
ranged (suppose ci,j conforms to a uniform distribution over [a . . . b], then L
should be close to n×(a+b)
2
, where n is the number of vertices).
Exact algorithms. Exact algorithms formulate TSP as an integer linear pro-
gram (ILP), and then solve TSP based on the linear relaxations of integer pro-
grams. The most commonly used one is the branch-and-bound (BB) algorithm, we
here briefly describe the BB algorithm proposed by Carpaneto and Toth [CT80],
which seems to be the basis of other BB algorithms.
The Carpaneto and Toth’s BB algorithm (refereed to as CTBB hereinafter)
uses the assignment problem (AP) as lower-bound criterion. Given n cities and a
cost matrix (ci,j), the assignment problem is to assign each city i a city j (j 6= i),
such that the total cost is minimum, and each city has been assigned and assigned
to other city exactly once. The AP can be regarded as a relaxed TSP which
allows sub-tours, see Figure 3.9 for illustration. If the AP solution happens to
be a Hamiltonian tour, then it is a solution to TSP as well. If the AP solution
contains sub-tours, CTBB algorithm tries to eliminate the sub-tours through the
following steps:
1. (Initialization)
Set the solution space S = X0, the best tour T = φ, its cost Z = inf, where






















Figure 3.9: Assignment Problem vs. Traveling Salesman Problem: (a) An instance
of AP, the leftmost circle means assigning A to B, and so on. (b) Corresponding
tour of (a). (c) An instance of TSP, the leftmost circle means traveling from A to
B, and so on. (d) Corresponding tour of (c).
2. (Subproblem selection)
If S = φ, stop. T is an optimal tour costs Z.
Otherwise, select an X ∈ S, and remove it from S.
3. (Lower-bounding)
Let A be the AP solution of X whose cost is Z∗.
If Z∗ > Z, this is a worse tour, discard it and go to step 2.
If Z∗ < Z and A is a Hamiltonian tour, this is a better tour. Let T = A,
Z = Z∗, go to step 2.
Otherwise, go to step 4.
4. (Branching)
Expand X by breaking the sub-tours, generate subproblems X1, X2, . . . , Xn,
with their AP costs Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 , . . . , Z
∗
n.
Let S = S
⋃ {Xi|Z∗i < Z, i = 1 . . . n}, go to step 2.
The detailed procedures for breaking sub-tours and generating subproblems can
be found in [CT80]. It has been determined that AP tour can be computed in
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O(n3) [MT87]. The CTBB algorithm does not have polynomial complexity, but
Carpaneto and Toth had solved 240-vertex TSPs in less than one minute on a
CDC 6600. With today’s CPU power, TSPs with hundreds of thousands vertices
are considered solvable.
Now let’s examine if CTBB algorithm works for XTSP as well. Among the
sub-tour elimination steps, the most important one is step 3. During the step, tour
with higher cost is discarded and tour with lower cost is accepted as new possible
solution. However, for the XTSP problem, one cannot either simply discard a tour
because its cost does not equal to the given cost L, or accept a tour because its
cost is close to the given cost L. This is because the total cost being close to L
or not gives no information about whether a tour is similar to the solution or not.
So branching cannot be done. This result can be generalized to other branch-and-
bound algorithms. Lucks in [Luc94] gives similar results using experiments.
In conclusion, both heuristic and exact algorithms are not adaptable to the
XTSP. Although not provable, current results show the only way to solve XTSP
is exhaustive search. For an n-city XTSP, the solution space contains (n − 1)!
different tours. With n = 41, the security of XTSP is comparable to 160-bit
digital signature schemes (since log2(40!) ≈ 160).
Modular XTSP
Definition 3.3.3
The modular XTSP is to find a Hamiltonian tour T in graph G such that
CostC(T ) = L (mod 2
l)
wherein l is a parameter which determines the security of modular XTSP.
For a graph of n vertices, there are altogether (n − 1)! different Hamiltonian
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tours, so T can be described using dlog2(n − 1)!e bits. It is nature to consider
both the length of ci,j and l equal to dlog2(n−1)!e so that the modular XTSP can
yield (n− 1)! uniformly distributed Ls. In fact l = dlog2(n− 1)!e defines the most
secure case of modular XTSP. This result has been rigorously proved in [Luc94].
3.3.2 RSE authentication method
The purpose of this section is to find a short authenticator for embedding into the
document using RSE scheme. A preferable way of doing this is to use the permu-
tation directly as the authenticator, thus maximizes the utilization of RSE. For
the total n! permutations over n permutation targets, we treat a very small subset
of the permutations as valid, then we can authenticate the document by examine
the presence of the permutation. Of course the verification of permutations must
be content-related, so as to prevent substitution attacks.
Given an n-permutation, we can create a directed Hamiltonian cycle by con-
catenating the first and last elements. And given a directed Hamiltonian cycle of
length n, we can create n corresponding permutations, by regarding each node in
the cycle as the starting point, as shown in Figure 3.10. This relationship between
(1 3 5 4 2)
(3 5 4 2 1)
(5 4 2 1 3)
(4 2 1 3 5)




Figure 3.10: Permutations and corresponding Hamiltonian cycle
permutation and Hamiltonian cycle enables us to authenticate the permutation by
authenticating its corresponding Hamiltonian cycle. Since the permutation is en-
coded into document using RSE watermark scheme, we name our authentication
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method the RSE authentication method.
For efficiency consideration, RSE authentication method authenticates a batch
of documents together. These documents can have the same contents but created
for different recipients or just have different contents. In business and administra-
tive environment, the need for differentiating recipients, or preparing a series of
documents for a single transaction is very frequent, so our method is adaptable.
Suppose there are N documents to be authenticated, we execute the following


















Figure 3.11: RSE authentication flowchart
1. Choose a number n such that n ≥ 41 and n× (n− 1) > N .
2. For each document, assign a distinct n-permutation Pi, i = 1 . . . N . Not
losing generality, we require P = (1, . . .) (normal notation, so there are
(n − 1)! different P s). Generating of permutations can be done by using
a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) to generate some random
numbers, convert the random number to (n − 1)-permutation using RSE
encoding algorithm, then insert 1 as the first element and adjust the following
elements accordingly.
3. Generate Hamiltonian tour Ti from Pi, i = 1 . . . N .
4. For each document, extract all text content or certain critical text content,
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then create a l = dlog2(n − 1)!e bits message digest of the contents using a
collision-resistant one-way hash function H(· · · ). The digests are denoted
using Li, i = 1 . . . N .
5. Create an all-zero n× n cost matrix C, then solve the equation:
CostC(Ti) = Li (mod 2
l), i = 1 . . . N (3.8)
by adjusting ci,j in C. Since there are n × (n − 1) unknowns in matrix C
(ci,i = 0 for i = 1 . . . N) and Equation 3.8 only contains N < n × (n − 1)
restrains, C is always solvable using linear algebra method.
6. Assign all unused ci,j random values. Then calculate
ci,j = ci,j (mod 2
l), i, j = 1 . . . N (3.9)
With this step, ci,j has been limited to l bits.
7. Finally, publish the cost matrix C as the verification key, and embed Pi into
corresponding document using RSE watermark scheme.
For verification of the document, the verifier first calculates the message digest
L′i from the document using the same one-way function H(· · · ). The verifier then
extracts the permutation Pi from the document, converts it to Hamiltonian tour




l), l = dlog2(n− 1)!e
The selection of one-way hash function H(· · · ) needs special consideration. It
must be able to output dlog2(n − 1)!e bits message digest. There has no such
variable length one-way functions been proposed except for the HAVAL [ZPS92]
(outputs 128, 160, 192, 224, 256 bits) and SHA-V (outputs 128, 160, 192, 224, 256,
288, 320 bits) algorithms. While truncating hash values to a lower number of bits
is possible, concatenating shorter values to form a longer value reduces security.
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We recommend selecting proper n values so that dlog2(n − 1)!e are comparable
to hash function outputs. Recommended values are n = 41, (log2(40!) ≈ 160),
n = 47, (log2(46!) ≈ 192), n = 52, (log2(51!) ≈ 224), n = 58, (log2(57!) ≈ 256),
n = 63, (log2(62!) ≈ 288), n = 68, (log2(67!) ≈ 320). For number of documents
more than 68× (68− 1) = 4556, it is possible to partition documents into several
groups, then generate cost matrix C for each group.
Once a cost matrix C has been fixed, adding more documents for authentica-
tion requires re-calculating the whole C. This is because otherwise an attacker
can compare the cost matrix before and after adding new documents to deter-
mine the newly used edges. For verification, it means the verifier must always
keep his copy of matrix C up-to-date. This resembles the verification of digital
signature where the verifier must retrieve the signer’s public information from a
trusted server. Nevertheless, if the cost matrix C has been fully utilized (authen-
ticate n × (n − 1) documents), the verifier needs only retrieve an average l-bit
value for one document. The communication bandwidth is much lower than that
of digital signature schemes. Considering other advantages such as the size of the
authenticator (permutation vs. encrypted message digest) and the computation
complexity (modular addtion vs. modular exponential or logarithm), RSE au-
thentication scheme is much superior than digital signature as long as electronic
documents are concerned.
3.3.3 Security analysis
The security of the authentication scheme is easily verified:
• For the total (n − 1)! possible Hamiltonian tours, we treats N of them







For n = 41, this figure is about 2×10−45, which means such a coincidence is
really rare. We do not specifically require distinct Hamiltonian tours produce
different costs. It is very unlikely because the space for cost values is at least
as large as the space for Hamiltonian tours (2l vs. (n−1)!). There is no way
to prevent collisions except enumerating all tours, which is an astronomical
figure.
• In order for an deliberate attacker to forge a document which can pass the
verification process, he must be able to do one of the following things:
1. He creates a new document and generates a hash value L′. In order to
embed a correct n-permutation P ′ into the document, he must solve
the modular XTSP to find a Hamiltonian tour T ′ that satisfies
CostC(T
′) = L′ (mod 2l)
The mathematical background shows it is intractable. Figure 3.12
shows such kind of attack (blocks marked with red diagonal lines indi-
cate vulnerability.)
2. He selects a Hamiltonian tour T ′ and calculates
L′ = CostC(T ′) (mod 2l)
Now he must reverse the one-way hash function H(· · · ) in order to
create a meaningful document and relevant information that hashes to
L′, as illustrated in Figure 3.13. It is also intractable since the one-way
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Figure 3.13: Attacking RSE authentication scheme (Method 2)
• Back to Figure 2.1. In RSE authentication method, the verification key is
the cost matrix C, the authenticator is the permutation P or Hamiltonian
tour T , and the embedding of P/(T ) into electronic document is through
RSE watermark scheme. It can be figured out that our method does not
have a specific authentication key, which means the sender Alice has nothing
secret. This issue makes impersonating attack possible. However, Alice has
the special power to publish C. If Alice puts C onto a trusted server, then
attacker had to compromise the servers to conduct a successful attack. The
attacking is shown in Figure 3.14.
In conclusion, RSE authentication method relies on theoretical security and
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Figure 3.14: Attacking RSE authentication scheme (Method 3)
ensure that a document has not been tampered with and has indeed originated
from a specific source. Our method is file format neutral, which solves the content-
based authentication problem in an interoperative environment. This is the major
advantage over traditional digital signature based schemes.
3.4 Tamper detection and copyright protection
In this section, we briefly discuss some other possible applications for RSE. We
propose a tamper detection method and a copyright protection method. Both
methods offer some advantages over their counter parts in electronic document
domain.
3.4.1 Tamper detection with RSE
In Section 3.2.4, we use experiments to show the fragility of RSE against modi-
fications. Modifying an RSE encoded document will only destroy the embedded
information at the places where modifications are made. We encode the same
permutation into the document for multiple rounds, or onto multiple permutation
targets, then the modified places can be located by comparing all permutations.
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Figure 3.15 shows an example of tamper detection with RSE.
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Figure 3.15: A tampered document
The sample document has been modified by deleting words “and change” in
line 3. As a result, the 27th letter “e” is missing and all “e”s after it are shifted
forward by one position. Here we consider the situation that we do not know the
original render sequence beforehand. If on the contrary we know it then detecting
modified places is much easier. In Figure 3.15, the render sequence is:
{11, 1, 5, 2, 9, 6, 7, 10, 8, 3, 4,
22, 12, 16, 13, 20, 17, 18, 21, 19, 14, 15,
32, 23, 24, 31, 27, 28, 31, 29, 25, 26,
43, 33, 37, 34, 41, 38, 39, 42, 40, 35, 36,
44, 45, 46}.
We assume the modifications only appear at a small part of the document. This
assumption is reasonable because most unauthorized modifications are aimed at
changing a few critical words rather than the whole document. We use the RSE
decoding algorithm to determine the permutation length. Here we find the per-
mutation length is 11 from the 1st, 2nd and the 4th lines. Since the majority of
the document has not been modified, the number 11 is credible, and modification
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must be in line 3. Substituting line 3 with the permutation obtained from line 1,
2 and 4, the proper sequence for line 3 should be
{33, 23, 27, 24, 31, 28, 29, 32, 30, 25, 26}.
Thus, we detect the modification as missing a permutation target “e” between the
23rd and 24th letter “e”s.
The addition of permutation targets can be similarly detected. In cases when
more accurate tamper detection is needed, we may increase the number of per-
mutation targets, e.g., permuting each vowel respectively, or permuting characters
together with words or even sentences.
The tamper detection method is especially handy if used together with the RSE
authentication method. This is because the length of the permutations used in the
RSE authentication method is very short. For most of the cases only a small part
of available permutation targets are permuted. It allows us to encode the same
permutation multiple rounds by taking advantage of the remaining permutation
targets, so the RSE decoding algorithm can be more accurate and the tampered
location is more easily identified.
3.4.2 Copyright protection with RSE
For most of the document watermark schemes we introduced in Section 2.1, their
original intention is to discourage illegal dissemination of copyrighted document.
To achieve this, they use watermark schemes to embed distinct hidden marks for
each recipient. When an illegally disseminated document is found, its hidden mark
is extracted so the original recipient is caught. The most important feature for a
watermark scheme to be used for copyright protection is robustness. In the pre-
vious works, the robustness has been identified as persistence over photocopies,
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scanning, printings, and so on. This is a little out-of-date nowadays as electronic
distribution of documents is the main form. Current on-line document distribu-
tion systems are usually equipped with access control software packages to limit
legitimate users’ rights. For electronic documents these rights mainly refer to the
rights to view or print the documents. Making illegal copies of a document by
dumping the contents from the screen is not an easy job because the software can
disable such operations. However, if the access control software allows a legitimate
user to print the document, the control is lost. This is because an attacker can
use “virtual printing” technique, which redirects the printing job to a file. If the
printer driver the attacker uses is a PostScript printer driver, then the dumped file
is in PostScript language. It is very easy to convert the PostScript file into other
formats such as PDF. Thus, an unprotected electronic document is obtained.
RSE watermark scheme can be used as a method to discourage “virtual print-
ing” attack. Our experiments in Section 3.2.4 show the RSE embedded information
can survive format transcoding and printing. So we can design an access control
software package, which encodes the user’s identity or other distinguishable in-
formation during printing of copyrighted material using RSE watermark scheme.
Later format transcoding cannot remove the information so the original user who
prints the document is traceable. It should be mentioned that RSE encoded in-
formation persists only if the converted document is still a formatted document.
This seems to be most of the cases since formatted document has tremendous
advantage over image-based document (consider indexing, searching, file size. . .).
However, copyright protecting through watermark schemes is still a topic worth
debating. It has been identified in [PAK98] that no watermark schemes is likely
to withstand all attacks. So the copyright watermark scheme is secure only if the
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attacker does not realize the existence of hidden information. This is “security
through obscurity (STO)”, which is not a good practice in computer security
domain. The protection of copyrighted content is still the task of the legal systems.
Technical means can only play a supportive role in this drive.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we started by identifying the requirements for protecting elec-
tronic document in an interoperative environment, which are the authentication
requirement and the rights description transferring requirement. The solution to
these two requirements resorts to a watermark scheme with sufficient information
carrying capacity, which we proposed as Render Sequence Encoding.
The major difference between RSE watermark scheme and existing watermark
schemes is that our scheme takes advantage of the redundancies in the page de-
scription languages of electronic documents. The redundancies are captured as
render sequences. By manipulating render sequences, we achieve information car-
rying capacity that is several orders of magnitude larger than all existing schemes.
RSE watermark scheme is robust in terms of surviving file format transcoding.
This feature archives interoperability by bridging rights description and authenti-
cator from one document format to another.
Based on the RSE watermark scheme, RSE authentication method adopts
modular XTSP to authenticate the document. The security of RSE authentica-
tion method is guaranteed by the intractability of XTSP. The advantage of RSE
authentication method over digital signature is its small authenticator size. With
this feature RSE authentication is adaptable to very short documents. Another
feature of RSE authentication is its compatibility with most popular document
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formats. It can be integrated into existing systems with only minor changes at the
creation and rendering ends of the whole workflow. RSE authentication method
facilitates the “management of rights holders’ relationship” by establishing trust
among parties involved in document exchange. It is thus a major building block
in the whole DRM system for electronic documents.
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Chapter 4
Print Signatures for Document
Authentication
In this chapter, we present a method to authenticate printer paper document by
utilizing the inherent non-repeatable randomness existing in the printing process.
The randomness results in unique features for each printed paper document, which
are captured as the print signature. We present theoretical and experimental
details on how to register and verify this print signature. This method facilitates
the realization of managing “ all forms of rights both in physical and digital form”.
4.1 Introduction
The definition of second-generation DRM tell us that DRM involves the manage-
ment of all forms of rights usages over both tangible and intangible assets – both
in physical and digital form. The inclusion of rights in physical form is the funda-
mental difference between the second-generation DRM and first-generation DRM.
For electronic documents, managing rights in physical form means managing rights
over printed paper documents. This involves authenticating printed paper doc-
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uments, and controlling the access rights to the printed paper documents. The
later one is usually enforced by physical means such as safe-box or lockers, which is
outside the scope of this thesis. We here concentrate the authentication methods
for printed paper document.
Research in the authentication of physical documents has been growing be-
cause of its commercial potential. Compared with its counterpart in digital do-
main, authenticating physical documents especially paper documents is much less
advanced. Recent research shows paper documents still form the basis of today’s
business transactions and administrative processes, and “will continue to occupy
an important place in office life, but will increasingly be used in conjunction with
an array of electronic tools [AH01]”. For that reason, authenticating printed pa-
per documents, which is the link between electronic tools and paper documents,
becomes extremely important.
In business and administrative environment, authenticity and originality are
the two basic requirements for any paper document to be considered valid. As
discussed in Section 2.2, existing authentication methods either cannot protect
the originality and authenticity of printed document simultaneously, or cost too
much to be widely used. In view of this, we present our novel print signature
authentication method which has the following advantages:
• Security: The print signature is unique for each printed document. Any
duplication attempt can be detected during the authentication phase. The
content of the document is also used in the validation process. Thus, both
authenticity and originality of printed paper documents are secured.
• Convenience: Our system can be implemented in a fully automated manner
for high–speed batch processing. It can also be incorporated in handheld
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devices for manual operation.
• Low Cost: Our solution works on any ordinary laser printers. No special
material or accessory is required. The cost of automatic verification devices
is quite low as well.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we’ll discuss the basis
of our method. In Section 4.3, the detailed authentication process is analyzed.
Experimental results are given in Section 4.4, and followed by the conclusion in
Section 4.5.
4.2 Basis of the method
Authenticity and originality are two major requirements for printed document
which need to be authenticated. It can be concluded from Section 4.1 that phys-
ical methods (special material and fingerprinting) prove more effective for estab-
lishing originality whereas cryptographic methods (digital encoding and optical
watermarking) protect authenticity better. Our proposal combines the advan-
tages of both these approaches. We first discuss new properties for protecting the
originality of documents, then consider the integration issues with cryptographic
techniques to lead to a complete solution.
4.2.1 Print signatures
Figure 4.1 depicts the major components of a laser printer’s imaging unit, which
develops a piece of printed paper over six steps [BK94]: A photosensitive surface
(photoreceptor) is uniformly charged with static electricity by a corona wire (1).






















Figure 4.1: How laser printer works1
beam, which discharges it at desired positions to form a latent or invisible image
(2). Development is done by spreading toner, a kind of fine powder, over the
surface. The powder adheres only to the charged areas, thereby making the latent
image visible (3). In the next step, electrostatic field transfers the developed image
from the photosensitive surface to a sheet of paper (4). The transferred image is
then fixed permanently to the paper by fusing the toner using pressure and heat
(5). The last step cleans off all excess toner and electrostatic charge from the
photoreceptor to make it ready for the next cycle (6).
As no process repeats exactly, we expect to observe variations in each step.
Such variations include the unevenness of the photosensitive surface and paper
surface, the variable granularity of the toner powder, unstable heat and pressure
of the fuser, amount of excess toner remaining on the photoreceptor, and many
other such factors. The net outcome of all these variabilities is that some toner
powder gets randomly misplaced at undesired positions. Such misplacement is
non-repeatable for each print run. This is because any repeatable defect can be
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detected during the quality control process and thus is fixed by improving the
printer design. It is much harder to fix random phenomena hence they persist.
Therefore, the pattern of misplaced toner powder on each paper is unique. We refer
to this unique pattern by print signature as a metaphor for the manual signature
on paper documents.
To study the characteristics of print signatures, we created a representative
test pattern as shown in Figure 4.2(a). The pattern comprises of four rounded
dots. The diameter of the dots is 0.07mm and the horizontal and vertical distance
between two adjacent dots is 0.21mm . These two numbers are selected by taking
both the physical limitations of the printer and experimental results into consid-
eration. The size of the dots is larger than the theoretically smallest dots the
printer can print (in this case 1/600 inch for a 600 dpi printer), so that the dots
are clearly visible after printing. On the other hand, the dots are enough small for
the random misplacement of toner powder to be significantly noticeable around
their boundaries. The distance between two adjacent dots and the configuration of
dots ensure that the printed dots will not merge together, which is very useful for
our later segmentation process. The number of dots balances the authentication
performance and required computational resources. We will provide more details
on this topic in the next section.
Figure 4.2 shows some experimental printouts and photocopies examined un-
der a 200× microscope. Image (b) and (c) are the test pattern printed using HP2
LaserJet 8100 (600dpi) office printer. Image (d) is the same test pattern printed
on a high resolution HP LaserJet 4050 (1200 dpi) printer. Apparently, the dis-
similarity among these patterns is large. Even for the same printer, we obtain a





(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 4.2: Printouts and Photocopies of the testing pattern: (a) Testing pattern.
(b) Testing pattern printed using LJ8100. (c) Testing pattern printed using LJ8100
again. (d) Testing pattern printed using LJ4050. (e) Photocopy of (b).
photocopier Minolta Di152f3. It is quite obvious that the photocopied image is
very different from the original one.
Besides the test pattern, occurrences of random toner powder misplacement
can also be noticed at boundaries of printed characters, as shown in Figure 4.3,
where images (a–e) are the source character, two test printouts on LaserJet 8100,
one test printout on LaserJet 4050, and a photocopy of (b) on the Minolta pho-
tocopier respectively. We observe the same phenomenon noticed in the previous
experiment that the print signature is random and non-repeatable for each print
run.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 4.3: Printouts and photocopies of character “p”: (a) Source pattern “p”.
(b) Source pattern printed using LJ8100. (c) Source pattern printed using LJ8100
again. (d) Source pattern printed using LJ4050. (e) Photocopy of (b).
We have performed many such experiments and have consistently observed this
3http://www.minolta.com/flash-copier.html
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occurrence for several types of laser printers. The experiments demonstrate the
uniqueness and randomness of our proposed print signature. Our method utilizes
some features of this phenomenon to authenticate the originality of printer paper
documents.
4.2.2 Basis of the method
Without loss of generality, we describe our proposed method based on the type
of print signature shown in Figure 4.2. We call this test pattern used in the
experiment secure pattern as it enables certain security features. With some minor
modification, our method can also apply to the print signature detected on printed






























Figure 4.4: System diagram
As illustrated in Figure 4.4, our method contains two procedures: registration
and verification.
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• Registration: Given a document to be protected, we print the secure pattern
onto some blank area of the paper. Several auxiliary landmarks are also
printed around the pattern to facilitate alignment. The printed paper is then
examined by a microscope. Features describing the print signature such as
the shape of the dots are detected and extracted. The feature description,
together with some critical information about the document (such as the
seat number in a concert ticket), forms a unique identifier for this specific
document and specific print run. A digital signature is then generated for
the identifier. The digital signature and the identifier are printed onto the
same document using digital encoding methods such as bar codes or OCR
fonts. These printed information and the secure pattern are used for later
verification. Figure 4.5 is a sample concert e-ticket protected using our
method.
Figure 4.5: Protected e-ticket
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• Verification: In order to verify the authenticity and originality of a printed
document, we first perform feature extraction as in the registration process
to get the feature description of the print signature. Also, the encoded
information is read from the document using either a bar code reader or
an OCR scanner. The digital signature is verified first to ensure there have
been no modifications to the document identifier. We then compare the
extracted feature and contents on the paper with the document identifier,
through a decision process. If the results match, the document is considered
to be authentic and original. Otherwise it considered to be a faked one or
have been tampered.
4.2.3 Feasibility analysis
We formalize the registration and verification procedures as follows:
The registration process can be described using:
S = ({F (P ), I}, Sig({F (P ), I})) (4.1)
where S is the printed information; Sig(·) is the digital signature scheme. P is the
print signature; F (·) is the feature extraction function which is used to generate
the description of print signature; and I is some critical information related to the
document.
The verification process can be described as:
V 1 = Vsig({F (P ), (I)}, Sig({F (P ), I}))
V 2 = DM(F ′(P ′), F (P ), I, I ′)
(4.2)
where V 1 is the verification of digital signature, V 2 is the verification of critical
document information and print signature. DM(·) is the discriminative decision
function; F ′(·), P ′ are the feature extraction function and the print signature
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respectively. It should be noted that P and P ′, F (·) and F ′(·) may not necessarily
be the same. This is because F (·) and F ′(·) are built into two different devices,
and the similarity between P and P ′ depends on the condition of the paper (e.g.
any salt and pepper noise) and the inspection environment (e.g. illumination,
focusing of the microscope, etc.).
Suppose an attacker intends to forge a document either by recreating a new
document or by modifying the contents of an authentic document. In this case,
his major task is to create a valid digital signature which can pass the verification
procedure V 1. This task is computationally infeasible unless the digital signature
scheme used is compromised.
Figure 4.6: Quantized dot image
The attacker can also photocopy/scan–reprint an authentic document and
claim it to be the original. The underlying task is to create a print signature
P ′ which is the same as P , or satisfies F ′(P ′) = F (P ) in order to pass V 2. In
[QG03], the authors have shown that completely recreating P through photocopy-
ing or scanning–reprinting with commercially available tools is impossible because
of the nonlinear distortions and halftoning effects. Since it can be argued that P
can be duplicated using professional equipment with higher resolution, let us refer
to Figure 4.6. This is the leftmost dot of Figure 4.2 (b) being examined under a
200× microscope with an CCD array of 320× 288 pixels. After quantization, the
94
dot covers an area of 40 × 59 pixels. Considering the physical size of the dot is
about 1/360 inch, this specific shape needs at least 59/(1/360) = 21240 dpi resolu-
tion printer to reproduce. The number is 17 times larger than today’s highest-end
laser printer which has a resolution of 1200 dpi. This analysis shows that even if
the attacker knows how an authentic print signature looks like, he does not have
any method to create it. What he can do is exhaustively create and test various
P ′, trying to find a collision wherein F ′(P ′) = F (P ). In the following sections,
we’ll show that the probability of successfully creating such a P ′ is extremely low.
4.3 Authentication Process
The authentication function essentially compares the print signatures and assesses
the degree to which a retrieved print signature matches the registered one. In
what follows, we will first describe the feature extraction of print signature, then
describe our matching algorithm and analyze its performance as well as security.
4.3.1 Feature Extraction for Print Signature
Feature extraction for print signature is performed during registration as well as
authentication. It takes captured images of the print signature P as the input,
and extracts the most descriptive features such as shapes, profiles, or spatial con-
figuration of P as the output.
In our test setup, the “IntelPlay QX3” 4 computer microscope is used to cap-
ture the image of the print signature P . We have selected this cheap (costing 50
US dollars) microscope as a low-cost scanner. As a result, the quality of captured
images is not always satisfactory. As shown in Figure 4.2(b-e), only the rough
4http://www.intel.com/support/intelplay/qx3/
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shape of the four dots is invariant under illumination and focus changes. There-
fore, we binarize and segment the four dots before extracting the shape as the
descriptor of the print signature.
• Binarization: Binarization involves the selection of an optimal threshold
such that the major features are preserved during conversion from a grayscale
to a binary image. Good binarization accuracy is very important for the
registration process which requires a precise description of the print signa-
ture. Illumination conditions and focus have a major influence on this. In
a bad-illuminated and out-of-focused image, the edges of the four dots will
be blurred, thus destroying the accuracy of binarization and later shape re-
trieval. To overcome this in the registration procedure, we first capture a
set of images under different focus and illumination conditions. Then the
images are binarized using the optimal threshold value defined by Otsu’s
algorithm [Ots79] which attempts to maximize the inter-class variance be-
tween the class of pixels above the threshold, and the class of pixels below.
The average form of these images is used as binarization result. During
authentication, we use Otsu’s threshold directly.
• Segmentation: Since we have the a priori knowledge of how the secure pattern
looks like, we can easily segment the four dots from the background. In case
the four dots cannot be segmented successfully, this information is fed back to
the binarizer, instructing it to adjust the threshold and redo the binarization.
A set of segmented images for Figure 4.2(b) are shown in Figure 4.7.
• Feature extraction: The security of our method relies on the performance of
feature extraction and matching for the print signature. In the test setup,
shapes of the four dots have been identified as the main feature of print
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.7: Segmented secure pattern: (a) Leftmost dot. (b) Bottommost dot. (c)
Rightmost dot. (d) Topmost dot.
signature, so the problem is reduced to a shape matching problem. In the
computer vision literature, shape matching methods have been studied for a
long time, and a variety of solutions have been discovered. [VH99] provides
a good review of these developments. However, our requirements are a bit
different. Traditional shape matching algorithms are usually robust against
affine transforms like translation, scaling or rotation. In our method, since
landmarks are used to assist alignment, this robustness is not required. We
can therefore use a simple radius profile as the descriptor for the shape of
the dots.
For each dot, the radius is calculated from its centroid to the perimeter.
Typical perimeter length of a dot in our experiment is between 180 to 200
pixels. Using all of them as the shape descriptor is not acceptable because:
1. The radius values are not independent of each other. Instead, the
position of each pixel on the perimeter is determined by the pixels
beside it. If the radius values of all pixels along the perimeter are used,
there will be a lot of redundancy in the data set.
2. Finally the descriptor will be encrypted and encoded using symbolic
encoding methods such as bar codes or OCR fonts. These methods
have limited storage capacity.
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Therefore, we partition the radius profile proportionally into several seg-
ments using polar coordinates and then calculate the average radius value
r′ for each segment, as shown in Figure 4.8.
Considering that the correlation between adjacent radius values of fan-shaped
segments is low, we assume the obtained set of r′ are independent variables.
Thus, the profile can be represented as:
~R′ = (r′1, r
′






Since we are only interested in the shape of the dots but not the size, we
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)T = (r1, r2, . . . , rN−1, rN)T (4.3)
Here N is the number of segments. It is a critical parameter for the overall
security. We leave the discussion about N for the next section.
Thus, the feature description of our print signature is represented as:
F (P ) = {~R1, ~R2, . . . , ~RM} (4.4)
where M is the number of dots used in the secure pattern.
4.3.2 Profile Matching
Referring to the matching function 4.2, DM is a discriminative decision function
that measures the similarity between extracted profiles of the print signature and
the registered profiles. It must be carefully selected so that no authentic document
is rejected (false-alarm rate is low) and no forged document is accepted (false-






































Figure 4.8: Profile of print signature: (a) Profile of dot. (b) Average profile (16
segments).
following Euclidean distance classifier to differentiate profiles:
Define Euclidean distance as:






For threshold T , we consider:
D(R,Rref ) < T → R and Rref are the same
D(R,Rref ) ≥ T → R and Rref are different
(4.6)
and DM :
R and Rref are the same for all M dots → ACCEPT
R and Rref are not the same for any of M dots → REJECT
(4.7)
Here, T , N andM are to be determined together with their performance analysis.
Matching using profiles can also be used for other types of print signatures such
as the one detected on characters as shown in Figure 4.3. The profile of arbitrary
shape is obtained by calculating the distance from its outermost perimeter to its
centroid. But since there is no fixed location for the print signature to be detected,
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the location of a specific print signature must be encoded into the barcode, and a
positioning mechanism is required to locate the print signature precisely.
4.3.3 Performance Analysis
In Equation 4.7, T and N are two very important parameters which determine
the performance of the classifier. When T increases, the classifier becomes more
robust against noise, but the false-acceptance rate increases. Conversely, when N
increases, D also increases, the classifier becomes more sensitive to variance, but
the false-alarm rate increases as well. We regard the radius values of the dots as
random variables and then use a statistical model to estimate the optimal values
for T and N .
To simplify the analysis, let us assume M = 1, that is, only one dot is used in
the secure pattern. As shown in Equation 4.3, for a single dot A, profile ~R can
be considered as a joint distribution of independent random variables r1 . . . rN .
The randomness of these variables comes from the environmental conditions when
capturing the image, and the threshold value used to binarize the image. To study
the distribution of these variables r1 . . . rN , we captured 100 images for the same
dot using different illumination and focusing conditions. For each image, we use 5
distinct threshold values for binarization. So altogether we obtained 500 binarized
images. Then for each different N from 8 to 64, we partition the profile into N
segments and calculate the average profile ~Rj,N , j = (1 . . . 500). The distribution
of each radius value ri in ~Rj,N can be determined by computing the histogram of
rj,N,i, j = (1 . . . 500), i = (1 . . . N) for each i. In our experiment, the shapes of the
histograms had a Gaussian profile, so we assume ri obeys a Gaussian distribution.
By using the “Bera-Jarque Normality Test” [Jud88], our hypothesis is verified
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with a P-value (significance level, the larger the better) of 40%.
Another useful result that we obtained from the experiments is that the stan-
dard deviation for each set of ri is almost the same. This can be explained as
follows: the randomness is homogeneous for all directions. We use symbol σ to
denote the standard deviation hereafter.
Let
R¯ = (r¯1, r¯2, . . . , r¯N−1, r¯N)T
denote the mean profile of dot A from the above experiments, and
R = (r1, r2, . . . , rN−1, rN)T
denote the profile of dot A obtained from one test, we have
ri − r¯i
σ
∼ N(0, 1), i = (1 . . . N)
which means that ri−r¯i
σ






Note that the reference value Rref is obtained from the registration process where
























is a chi-square cumulative distribution with N degrees of freedom.
We demand that the “false-alarm” rate be lower than 0.5%, or,
P (D(R,Rref ) > T ) < 0.005
Table 4.1 shows the acceptable T and N values under this requirement.
N σ2 χ2(N) = 0.995 T
72 0.001589 106.7 0.16940
36 0.001241 61.58 0.07641
32 0.001246 56.33 0.07017
24 0.001063 45.56 0.04841
16 0.001015 32.27 0.03478
8 0.000821 21.96 0.01801
Table 4.1: Choice of segments and threshold under false-alarm rate < 0.5%
In Section 4.2.3, we raised the question that whether it is possible to find
another profile P ′ such that F ′(P ′) = F (P ). We rephrase the problem under
the current context to ask the question: given a discriminative function D and
parameters N and T , how large is the probability for two distinct profiles R and
R′, to have D(R,R′) < T .
To answer this question, we must know the distribution of radius r across
different dots. Our experiment on 400 different dots shows that the distribution
of r is Gaussian, with an average P-value of “Bera-Jarque Normality Test” of 37%.
The result is easy to explain: the average radius value of the dots is our designed
dot’s radius in the secure pattern. By the central limit theorem, the distribution
of radius value must conform to a Gaussian distribution under the sum of a large
number of random influences.
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Now consider two distinct profiles R and R′, and
ri, r
′
i ∼ N(r¯, σ2r), i = (1 . . . N)
where r¯ is the average radius value and σr is the standard deviation of radius r,
we have
(ri − r′i) ∼ N(0, 2σ2r),
ri − r′i√
2σ2r
















Substituting T and N using the values shown in Table 4.1, we have the false-
acceptance rate as shown in Table 4.2.
N σ2r P (D(R,R
′) < T )
72 0.02387 4.468× 10−34
36 0.02228 1.333× 10−18
32 0.01846 8.636× 10−15
24 0.02078 3.787× 10−13
16 0.01846 3.950× 10−08
8 0.01291 4.680× 10−04
Table 4.2: The false-acceptance rate
We can find that the probability of successfully creating a print signature whose
profile P ′ can pass our verification process is very low even for only one dot. For
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a secure pattern with M dots, since we accept a document to be authentic only
when the profiles of all M dots are matched, the false-alarm rate will be
1− (1− Pf.alarm)M ,
and the possibility of false–acceptance wherein all M faked dots are matched will
be
PMf.accpt
Use Pf.alarm = 0.5%, N = 32 and M = 4 as an example, the false-alarm rate
becomes 1.98% and the false-acceptance rate is reduced to 5.562×10−57. The false-
alarm rate is slightly increased but the false-acceptance rate is greatly decreased.
Of course, the use of more dots requires more computation. The choice of M
should be balanced between security concerns and acceptable resource costs.
It must be pointed out that our reasoning is based on the assumption that the
radius r is a continuous random variable. In practice, since the value must be
quantized, the false-alarm and false-acceptance rate will be amplified. However,
this problem can be mitigated by the use of high resolution image sensors.
4.4 Experimental results
In this section, we will present extensive experimental results to demonstrate the
feasibility of our proposed method for document authentication. Our experiments
are intended to test whether an authentic document can successfully pass the au-
thentication process, and a forged document can be successfully rejected. We use
N = 32/T = 0.07017 as shown in Table 4.1, because these values seem to be
optimal in terms of good discriminative power as well as low storage requirement.
The secure patterns used in the experiments are composed of 1–4 small dots re-
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spectively. The printers used are a HP LaserJet 8100 monochrome printer and
a HP LaserJet 4600 color printer. For the color printer, the secure pattern was
printed using the black channel. The paper we used in the experiments includes
plain paper, color paper, translucent paper and card paper. These types of paper
are widely used in all kinds of business and administrative documents such as
certificates, bills of lading, invoices, licenses and checks.
We printed authentic documents with combinations of secure patterns, printers
and papers. Some captured pattern images are shown in Figure 4.9. The reference
profile for a secure pattern was obtained by averaging the results from multiple
tests as was discussed in Section 4.3.1. For each authentic document, we cap-
ture another 50 images by changing illumination, focusing, and by applying some
small mis-alignments. The Euclidean distances between the profile of these images
and the reference profile are marked using ‘o’ in Figure 4.10. We also created 50
forged copies for each authentic document by reprinting/scanning–reprinting the
same document. We did not perform the photocopying test because our initial ex-
periments had shown that the quality of photocopied documents is very bad. The
print signature was destroyed to such an extent that we could not even segment
the dots. The Euclidean distances between the profile of these forged images and
the reference profile are marked using ‘x’ in Figure 4.10.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.9: Experimental print signatures: (a) Plain paper. (b) Color paper. (c)
Translucent paper. (d) Card paper.
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Figure 4.10: Experimental results for print signature: (a) Plain paper. (b) Color
paper. (c) Translucent paper. (d) Card paper.
As we can see from the results, no forged document has been accepted. But
as the number of dots increases, there have been a few occasions that authentic
documents are rejected. This result conforms to our designed false-alarm rate of
0.5% for one dot and 1.98% for four dots. Rejecting all forged documents at the
expense of erroneously rejecting a few authentic documents is acceptable since
in most cases forged documents can cause a lot more damages. However, if we
perform another round of validation when a document is rejected, the false-alarm
rate can be greatly reduced.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel authentication technique for printed
paper document. The print signature is based on the inherent randomness present
in the physical printing process. The security of the method is guaranteed by both
the digital signature and the print signature. The method has been demonstrated
to be secure against forgery and duplication attacks.
As the laser printing technology improves, the printing resolution will become
even higher. However, as long as the underlying mechanism is unchanged, we still
expect to see the random phenomenon on each copy of printed paper. This will
only entail the use of microscopes of even higher resolution.
This method can be readily extended to other document types such as offset-
printed documents, ink-jet printed documents, or manually signed documents. It
basically reduces to the task of finding unique randomness in each copy of the
document to be used as a signature. For example, the ink trail for each manually
signed document is unique. As long as the uniqueness is found, a new document
authentication method based on the same principle can be developed.
Print signature authentication method can be integrated with RSE authenti-
cation method to form an end-to-end document authentication system, as shown
in Figure 4.11.





Figure 4.11: Integrating RSE and print signature
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1. The sender creates a document together with the render sequence authenti-
cator. He also specifies some access rights to the document, such as whether
the document can be printed, and how many copies can be printed. The
authenticator and the access rights are encoded into the document using
RSE watermark scheme.
2. When the document reaches at the receiver’s side, the receiver authenticates
the document first using RSE authentication method. He then extracts and
executes the access rights. If the document is printable, he creates a print-
able version of the document, selects some critical document information
to be protected, encodes the information into document again using RSE
watermark scheme, then sends the documents to the printing system for
printing.
3. The printing system prints the document with print signature. The “critical
document information” required is obtained from RSE embedded informa-
tion.
4. The printed paper document is finally given to the end user for verification.
It can be seen from the system that the communications among different par-
ties contain nothing special except normal file exchanges. This is attributed to
the RSE watermark scheme and paper-based authentication method, which en-
able additional security without modifying the existing protocol. The document’s
authenticity and originality is well protected in the whole creation–deployment–
usage process. It realizes the objective of “managing all forms of rights both in
physical and digital form”.
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Chapter 5
Model and Framework for XML
Based Access Control
In this chapter, we present an XML based access control framework. Access
control is required for interactive document creation, where users’ privileges are
governed by the system policy. The access control framework is further incorpo-
rated with other document security features to form an integrated DRM system
framework, which provides end-to-end rights management for both electronic and
paper documents.
5.1 Introduction
In business and administrative environments, a DRM system should facilitate
exchanges of ideas among authors during document drafting, leading to the final
version. Versioning and interfacing with databases and other existing document
frameworks for automatic document processing are preferable. Such cooperative
document creation scenario poses great challenges upon the interoperability and
security of the system, which can be briefly identified as two basic requirements:
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1. Defining a set of standard interchangeable semantics and vocabulary for
business and administrative document description. This standard forms the
foundation of the intra- and inter-organizational document exchange. It
includes not only document format definition, but also a set of standard
methods of database interfacing (for data collection) and form generation
(for creating human-readable documents).
2. Formulating a set of standard rights expression languages (RELs), and de-
signing access control method to enforce users’ rights. Access control applies
to both document drafting and document deployment stages. It requires that
the authors and the end users conform to a pre-defined set of rights usages
so as to maintain trusted relationship among them.
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) offers an ideal platform for docu-
ment exchange because of its favorable features of opening standards, extensibility,
easy database interfacing and platform neutrality. Recent evidence [Mar03] shows
global adoption of XML as a standard business language has become a trend.
Although rival business XML specifications exist (e.g., ebXML1, boleroXML2 and
RosettalNet3), we have sufficient reason to believe that XML will be the founda-
tion of business and administrative documents for the future. In this sense, the
adoption of XML format basically fulfills the first requirement.
An important feature of XML is that it can represent information at different
levels of sensitivity. Developing access control mechanisms that define which part
of the document is accessible by whom thus becomes a hot topic in the research
community. In this chapter, we consider a role based access control (RBAC) frame-





technologies include ODRL, XML Schema and XML Schematron. It conforms to
the standard RBAC model, so its security is verified and trustworthy.
We have introduced the basis of access control model and rights expression
languages in Section 2.3. In the next, we first present our XML based RBAC
framework in Section 5.2, then present an integrated DRM framework for elec-
tronic documents in Section 5.3. The chapter is concluded in Section 5.4.
5.2 XML based RBAC framework
It has been identified that role-based access control “addresses many of the security
needs of both the commercial and government sectors [NIS99]”. The implementa-
tion of RBAC framework requires two set of specifications: one defines the RBAC
components and their relationship, for example, the user, role, permission, and
user-role assignment components; the other defines the constraints in the construc-
tion of the framework, notably the cardinality and separation of duties constraints.
For illustrative purpose, we present our XML based RBAC framework within the
context of a real-world document workflow in the shipping industry. As we’ve
discussed in Section 1.1, the process is very document intensive. We first briefly
describe the existing process, and then consider how the process can be formulated
and implemented using XML and RBAC model.
5.2.1 Document workflow in shipping application
Figure 5.1 is a simplified workflow of bills of lading (Bs/L) document workflow
used in the shipping industry. For a shipper to consign with a shipping company
to ship some cargo, the following steps are carried out:
1. The shipper submits a new B/L request to the shipping line, specifying
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information such as port of loading, port of discharging, cargo details, etc.
2. On receiving the B/L request, a port clerk from the shipping company pro-
cesses the information, updates specific fields for the shipper to confirm.
The shipper reviews the updated information, either confirms or makes fur-
ther amendments for the port clerk to confirm. The process is carried out
iteratively until both sides have confirmed.
3. The confirmed B/L request is sent to the port manager for approval.
4. On approval, the port manager prints the original Bs/L (typically contains
3 original negotiable Bs/L and 2 copies of non-negotiable Bs/L) and signs
each negotiable B/L. The document set is then sent to the discharging port










Port A Port B
Figure 5.1: Document workflow in shipping industry
The 4th step in the B/L workflow is very costly, and usually results in addi-
tional delay in the entire transaction. The current workaround is that some ship-
ping companies give their valued customers pre-printed blank B/L so that their
customers can print the details and sign on behalf of the shipping companies.
However the shipping companies are unable to control or track what is actually
printed on these forms and who has access to the forms. Alteration, forgeries and
fraud using such documents are common. The shipping industry is in urgent need
for an Internet-based Bs/L document workflow system which provides convenient
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document delivery as well as strict access control to the all parties participated in
the workflow.
5.2.2 RBAC for B/L workflow
The heart of the B/L document workflow is the B/L source data, which are de-
scribed using XML format to facilitate data exchange. The access control is to
grant or deny user’s operation to these data. We attach one record of B/L (List-
ing A.1, bl.xml) source data at the appendix of this thesis. This file describes
the required data for generating a valid B/L document. Note that the <status>
element at line 21 shows the current state of the B/L. It has 5 possible values:
• both not confirmed – Both the shipper and the port clerk have not con-
firmed the B/L.
• wait shipper confirm – The port clerk has confirmed the B/L, waiting for
the shipper to confirm.
• wait clerk confirm – The shipper has confirmed the B/L, waiting for the
port clerk to confirm.
• both confirmed – Both the shipper and the port clerk have confirmed the
B/L, waiting for the port manager to approve.
• approved – The port manager has approved the B/L. It is ready for printing
and deployment.
Access rights of different users are determined not only by the users’ privilege, but
also by the status of the B/L, which are explained below.
Role definition and privilege identification
Four categories of users (roles) can access the B/L source data:
• Shipper – Modify <shipper id>, <loading port>, <discharging port>,
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<consignment> elements, read <negotiable>, <nonnegotiable> elements,
and update <status> element if the original status was ’both not confirmed’
or ’wait shipper confirm’. When the B/L has been approved by the man-
ager (<status>=’approved’), shipper can print negotiable B/L if left copies
<negotiable/left> is larger than zero, or print non-negotiable B/L if left
copies <nonnegotiable/left> is larger than zero.
• Port clerk – Read all the elements, modify <clerk id>, <vessel name>, and
update <status> element if the original status was ’both not confirmed’
or ’wait clerk confirm’.
• Port Manager – Inherit all privileges from the port clerk, additionally can
modify <manager id> element and update <status> element if the original
status was ’both confirmed’.
• Application – This is a role hidden in the workflow. It performs all the
background jobs to maintain the integrity of the B/L, which include:
– Update <bl id> and <internal ref> elements when a new B/L re-
quest has been submitted.
– Update the <negotiable> element with (<printed>=0, <left>=3)
and <nonnegotiable> element with (<printed>=0, <left>=2) when
the B/L has been approved by the port manager.
– Update <negotiable> and <nonnegotiable> elements when the ship-
per prints the B/L.
Role hierarchy
The role hierarchy is shown in Figure 5.2. Roles higher in the hierarchical chain






Figure 5.2: Role hierarchy for the B/L workflow
Constraints
A set of constraints help to maintain the integrity of the B/L document and the
workflow, which include:
1. The maximum number of users that can be assigned to “Application” role
is one.
2. The following pair of roles cannot be assigned to the same user (static sep-
aration of duties):
• “Shipper” and “Application”
• “Shipper” and “Port manager”
• “Shipper” and “Port clerk”
• “Port clerk” and “Port manager”
3. The following pair of roles cannot be activated in a same session (dynamic
separation of duties)
• “Application” and “Port clerk”
• “Application” and “Port manager”
The definitions of roles, privileges, role hierarchy and constraints directly map
to the corresponding components in NIST RBAC model as shown in Figure 2.3.
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5.2.3 B/L RBAC framework
In our B/L RBAC framework, the access control policies are described and stored
in XML format. The adoption of XML into RBAC framework requires that the
XML description can: 1. Define all the components in RBAC model accurately.
2. Exercise all constraints in RBAC model strictly. We put these definitions and

















Figure 5.3: XML based RBAC framework
In this framework, the access control policy is described in rbac.xml. XML
Schema RBAC.xsd and ODRLX-DD.xsd provides syntactic specification for the def-
inition of RBAC components. XML Schematron rbac.sch provides semantic
validation to rbac.xml and the run-time session database session.xml. Through
session.xml, the system is able to grant or deny access operations to the object,
bl.xml. In a typical implementation, RBAC.xsd, ODRLX-DD.xsd and rbac.sch
are designed by the system integrator or developer to formulate the RBAC con-
trol model. The RBAC policy description rbac.xml is created by the system
administrator which defines company specific permissions, roles, users and user-
role assignment. It is to be regarded as one instance of the RBAC implementation.
Run-time session database session.xml is created by the application, which dy-
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namically records user logins and session activations. We have included a set of
example files in the appendix of this thesis. In what follows, we present some
details about RBAC.xsd, ODRLX-DD.xsd and rbac.sch to examine how the RBAC
model is implemented using these files.
Components definition using XML Schema
The definitions of RBAC components in rbac.xml must conform to application
specific data types, content relationships and structures. XML Schema [W3C01a,
W3C01b, W3C01c] is the technology to establish such specification. The advan-
tage of XML Schema over its alternative the Document Type Definition (DTD)
is that XML Schema supports complex constraints for XML components such as
elements, attributes and data types, thus strengthens the veracity of the specifica-
tion. We use XML Schema RBAC.xsd to define the “User”, “Permission”, “Role”,
“User-Role Assignment” components in RBAC model, as shown in Figure 5.4
(generated using XMLSpy 4 software). At the top level of RBAC Schema are
Figure 5.4: RBAC Schema (RBAC.xsd)
4http://www.xmlspy.com
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the definitions of <users>, <permissions>, <roles> and user-role assignments
(<uras>) components. Each <role> component contains one or more references
to the <permission> components to implement the Permission Assignment (PA)
task in Figure 2.3. User-role assignments <uras> element contains a sequence of
<ura> elements, each of which combines a role with the users assigned to that role
through XML reference too. The advantage of using element references instead
of defining elements locally is that we can separate permission and user defini-
tions under other namespaces or databases so as to encourage data re-use. The
complete listing of RBAC.xsd is attached in Listing A.2, inside which two elements
deserve more explanations:
Schema for the <role> element. The RBAC model for B/L workflow in Sec-
tion 5.2.2 defined four types of roles: “application”, “clerk”, “manager” and “ship-
per”. The RBAC Schema hence must provide means for limiting the role definition
inside these types. We include an attribute id in the <role> element to serve this
purpose. The value of the id attribute has been restricted as enumeration of four
options: “application”, “clerk”, “manager” and “shipper” (lines 63–73). We also
use xs:ID data type to define id, so no duplicated id value are allowed. Through
this definition, any illegal implementation of <role> elements can be invalidated
using the Schema.
Schema for the <permission> element. The definition of the <permission>
element is the most complicated. Simple permissions like “observation” or “alter-
ation” are too general to give precise descriptions. Here we base our permission
definition on ODRL specification which is a lot more advanced. The term “per-
mission” in RBAC model allows a set of “operations” onto a set of “objects”.
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In ODRL syntax, the corresponding terms of “permission”, “operation” and “ob-
ject” are <rights>, <asset> and <permission>, respectively. ODRL assembles
these terms inside an <agreement> element, meaning that the <rights> contain
<permission> over <asset>. ODRL also allows <constraint> element as a child
of <permission>, which adds restrictions to the permissions. By this structure,
ODRL is capable of defining very complex rights, especially in the context of dig-
ital media distribution. However, we must make two extensions for ODRL to be
used to express permissions on XML data source.
The first extension is to add XPath [W3C99] expression into ODRL’s <asset>
element. It is to solve the UID inability problem we identified in Section 2.3.2.
The XPath expression is added as a substitution to the ODRL context model. It
introduces a new <selector> element with an xpath attribute which points to
the specific XML nodes as the ODRL asset. For example, we can identify the






The second extension is to add an XPath based condition evaluator into
ODRL’s <constraint> element. With this extension we can support conditional
permission definitions which are required in business and administrative environ-
ments, for example, the shipper can modify the <shipper id only of the <status>
was ’both not confirmed’ or ’wait shipper confirm’. The extension is added
as a substitution to the ODRL constraint element model. It introduces a new
<assert> element with a test attribute which defines a XPath evaluator. An
<assert> element inside an ODRL <constraint> element means that the con-
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straint is effective only if the assertion is successful. For example, we can define











11 "(/ bill_of_lading/status=’both_not_confirmed ’)||





The above definition uses ODRL <agreement> element to combine extended <asset>
and <permission>, meaning that the system allows for ’modify’ permission onto
<asset> only if the evaluation of <assert> constraint is true.
The two ODRL extensions are defined using a separated Schema file ODRL-DD.xsd,
as listed in Listing A.3. We’ve also included a commented RBAC policy defini-
tion (rbac.xml) in Listing A.4 as an illustration of the definitions of other RBAC
components as well as the assembly of all these components.
Constraints specification using XML Schematron
By introducing XML Schema, we have successfully realized the role definition,
privilege identification, role hierarchy and user-role assignment tasks. Here, Schema
serves as the design tool, establishing a framework on which implementations can
be built. XML Schema not only specifies the syntactic structures for RBAC policy
(rbac.xml) creation, but also provides limited semantic constraints in term of pre-
venting duplicated elements using xs:ID or string enumeration (e.g., role/@id)
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data type. However, such constraint alone is not sufficient to constitute a solid
framework for access control. Quite a few domain-specific policy constraints (see
Section 5.2.2) have not been addressed. The reason why XML Schema cannot
support these constraints is that the constraints restrict the content of XML doc-
ument, while XML Schema only restricts the structure of the document.
Currently there have been two approaches proposed as complements to the
DTD or XML Schema for XML content validation – the XML Constraint Spec-
ification Language (XCSL) [Ram01] and the XML Schematron [Dod01]. We use
XML Schematron in our framework because Schematron is pure XML based tech-
nology and seems to gain more support.
Schematron validates XML content with a simple action: find a context node
in XML document based on XPath criteria, then check to see if some other XPath
expressions are true for the node. In the Schematron constraint definition, the
<rule> element sets the context; within the <rule> element are one or more
<assert> elements, each of which evaluates an XPath expressions and emits pre-
defined strings or invoke optional <diagnostic> procedures if the assertion fails.
A skeleton of XML Schematron is:
1 <rule>
2 <assert test="..." diagnostics="...">Error text</assert >
3 <diagnostics >
4 <diagnostic id="...">Error text</diagnostic >
5 </diagnostics >
6 </rule>
We now illustrate how different types of constraints can be expressed using XML
Schematron.
The first type of constraint is data type validation in XML element refer-
encing/dereferencing. Strictly speaking data type validation is not a seman-
tic constraint, but XML Schema does not provide any means to support such
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validation. For example, the <role> element in rbac.xml contains references
to the <permission> elements. But the references are defined using xs:IDREF
type in XML Schema which cannot differentiate what type of elements it is re-
ally referencing. As such, it is always possible to reference a <user> element
in place of <permission> meanwhile the violation cannot be detected by XML
Schema. By using XML Schematron, we can read the reference identifier from
<role/permission/@ref> attribute, and check if it really refers to a <permission>
element, as shown in lines 5–13 in rbac.sch (Listing A.5).
The second type of constraint is the cardinality constraint defined in Sec-
tion 5.2.2. For example, the B/L RBAC model requires that only one user can
be assigned to the “application” role. If we use XML Schema to support this
constraint, we would have to define a special user-role assignment (<ura>) ele-
ment which allows only one <user> element as its child. It is very cumbersome
approach when more and more cardinality constraints are required. With XML
Schematron, we can count the number of users under each role using XPath’s
count() function, and determine if the number violates the constraint. For exam-
ple, lines 14–24 in rbac.sch count the number of users under the <ura> element
whose <role> element references to “application” role, and emit error messages
when the number does not equal to one.
The third type of constraint defines the “separation of duties (SOD)” constraint
in the NIST RBAC model. It specifies a set of conflicting roles that a single
user cannot be assigned to these roles simultaneously. For example in our B/L
workflow, no users can be assigned to both “shipper” role and “application” role.
XML Schema cannot exercise this constraint. With XML Schematron, we can
specify this constraint using XPath query and evaluation. We first obtain two sets
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of users who are assigned to the “shipper” role and the “application” role, then
use XPath = operator to check if there is an intersection. The specific Schematron
code is listed in lines 25–34 in Listing A.5. This Schematron constraint can also
be used to support “dynamic separation of duties (DOD)’. It basically reduces to
the task of finding the intersection between two set of users who have activated
conflicting roles.
It is worth to note that the above three types of constraints respectively realized
the restrictions on XML attribute value, number of elements, and relationship
among elements. Together with the XML Schema which is capable of restricting
the type of elements, all the primitive XML building blocks have been included.
So it is sufficient to conclude that other constraints can also be implemented using
XML Schema and Schematron technologies.
Conclusion
Through the use of XML Schema and Schematron, we have defined a framework
to implement role-based access control using XML technologies. We have also
brought in extended ODRL for rights expression, which greatly eases the need for
complex usage controls. Unlike XACML [And03] which stops at the “description”
level, our method combines both definition and validation into a single frame-
work. The validation does not require any proprietary utilities but standard XML
Schema and Schematron validator. Since the construction of our XML framework
is based on the standard RBAC model, and all the components and constraints
in RBAC model have been successfully realized, our framework can be considered
as a secure and effective implementation of RBAC framework.
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5.3 Towards an integrated DRM framework
The RBAC model and framework we discussed in the previous section is aimed
at strengthening the security of XML data source and XML document in the
document’s creation and deployment stages. Using XML as the only file format
to conduct business or administrative transactions is hardly to be true at least
in the near future. People still need formatted electronic documents and paper
documents everywhere for viewing and exchanging. By adopting the “Render
Sequence Encoding” and “Print Signature” method we proposed in the previous
chapters, we can build an end-to-end integrated DRM framework for electronic
documents workflow.
Still using the shipping company sample, an end-to-end DRM framework is





















Figure 5.5: An integrated DRM framework for shipping companies
The figure illustrates the creation, deployment and end-user stages of B/L
workflow. At the creation stage, the DRM system mainly interfaces with authors
like port clerks, port managers and shippers for the creation of data needed by a
final B/L. Access control among these users is the major task in this stage. Our
XML based RBAC framework is designed to address this problem by managing
their rights and usages on a role-based manner. The security measures in this
124
stage are taken from two perspectives: XML Schema and Schematron protect
the system architecture by eliminating all illegal policy specifications and user
activities, and the ODRL protects the integrity of B/L data by limiting the usage
rights.
When the original B/L is to be delivered to the discharging port, it must be
formatted into human readable electronic documents. Existing XML tools which
do document formatting include XSL Formatting Objects (XSL-FO) 5 style sheets
and formatting engines. The authenticity and integrity of formatted documents
are the major targets of protection in this stage. Our “Render Sequence Encoding
(RSE)” method addresses this requirement by hiding content-related information
into documents during formatting. Access control over formatted documents is
enforced by ODRL rights descriptions. For example, the shipper is allowed to
print negotiable B/L three times. The license for printing is described as:
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <o-ex:rights
3 xmlns:o -dd="http://odrl.net /1.1/ODRL -DD"




























It allows a shipper holding a valid X.500 identity to display the B/L unlimited
times, but print only 3 times. Using ODRL facilitates interoperation between
shipping company and shippers, because ODRL is an open standard which is easy
to follow and implement. Transferring of ODRL license is archived using RSE, by
embedding ODRL license into the formatted document itself.
The shipper at discharging port authenticates the document and print nego-
tiable B/L according to embedded ODRL license. The printed B/L will be finally
presented to a warehouse keeper for claiming of the cargo. The authenticity and
originality of the B/L become extremely important in this stage. The “Print
Signature” method is used to provide this protection. Instead of giving their cus-
tomers pre-printed blank Bs/L, the shipping company gives/loans their shippers
specialized printers and computer systems capable of printing Bs/L and making
print signatures. The printing process is done interactively with shipping com-
panies’ database server. Holding the Bs/L with valid print signature, shippers
are ready to claim cargo shipped to them. At the verification side, the warehouse
keeper has been equipped with devices capable of authenticating Bs/L by verifying
the print signature. The verification process is done off-line with no need to access
any database. It is also possible for several shipping companies to share one sin-
gle authentication device, because digital signatures can sufficiently differentiate
them apart. Through this manner, the authenticity and originality property has
been successfully migrated from the electronic world to the paper world. Thus,
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the whole integrated framework is complete and end-to-end.
It must be noted that although our discussion has been carried out in the
context of Bs/L workflow for shipping industry, the DRM framework is easily
extended to other electronic document workflow which demands security and in-
teroperability. The implementation basically reduces to the task of identifying
roles, permissions and constraints in the existing systems, describing these com-
ponents using XML technologies, and linking the document creation system to the
RSE-enabled document formatting system and print signature-enabled document
printing system.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed an XML based access control framework for
XML documents. The framework is built on top of the traditional role-based
access control model. The advantage of adopting XML technology is that XML
is platform, operating system and application neutral. It serves as a glue layer
among interacting systems to achieve interoperability. Our approach uses XML
Schema and Schematron as the modeling language to provide both syntactic and
semantic constraints, so our framework is a verifiable and complete implementation
of RBAC.
Our XML RBAC framework incorporates ODRL as rights expression. Using
a mature and open rights expression language instead of developing a proprietary
one can greatly improve the flexibility and reliability of the framework. We also
made extensions to the ODRL specification which use standard XPath query and
expression evaluation to support elemental level and conditional rights description
for XML documents. Although the extensions are proposed under RBAC context,
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they are actually independent technologies and can be used in other XML security
applications.
Based on the XML RBAC framework, we proposed an integrated DRM frame-
work for electronic documents. This large framework incorporates the RSE and
Print Signature technologies proposed in previous chapters for persistent protec-
tion of electronic documents. It ensures the authenticity, integrity and originality
for both electronic documents and paper documents. The framework can find
applications in many business and administrative document workflow systems.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis presents multiple aspects of digital rights management for electronic
documents. We have shown that digital rights management contains different
requirements for different applications. In the business and administrative envi-
ronment, a DRM system should protect authenticity, integrity and originality of
the documents, facilitate inter-operations, and provide strict access control.
DRM is “digital” management of rights. The rights apply to the whole life
cycle of targeted assets, in both tangible and intangible form. This DRM definition
motivated us to conduct our research along the creation – deployment – end user
stages of document workflow, and extend the management issues from electronic
documents to printed documents.
For the document creation stage, managing authors’ relationship is the fore-
most task. The solution is access control, which is governed by global policies
to limit the permission of each author, and enable cooperation among them. We
have proposed a role-based access control framework using XML technologies.
The framework is specified using XML Schema and XML Schematron. These two
specifications provide syntactic and semantic validation to the policy description,
129
such that misuse or violations to the policy can be detected both statically and at
run time. We advocate using XML as the exchanging format among authors, and
our access control model is able to specify permissions to any subparts in a single
XML file. The permissions are expressed using extended ODRL, and integrated
into RBAC framework.
For the document deployment stage, maintaining the interoperability and au-
thenticity of the electronic document is most important. We’ve identified the
challenging problem of authenticating electronic documents while allowing docu-
ment format transcoding. The specific solution we propose is digital watermark.
We have designed a specialized watermark algorithm named “Render Sequence
Encoding”, which is most suitable for formatted electronic documents. The RSE
watermark exhibits large information carrying capacity and robustness against
document format transcoding. We use RSE to bridging rights description across
different versions and formats of electronic documents. RSE authentication algo-
rithm also protects the authenticity of the documents. Defeating the authenticity
requires solving an NP complete Exact Traveling Salesman Problem (XTSP). The
security of our watermark scheme is guaranteed by the intractability of XTSP
which has been studied for several decades.
When the document reaches at the end users’ site and gets printed, authen-
ticity information from electronic world must be transferred to the paper world.
We proposed “Print Signature” method to authenticate printed document. The
method utilizes the inherent non-repeatable randomness existing in the printing
process, which results in unique features for each printed document. We have
designed a set of procedures to register and verify the unique features. The “Print
Signature” method fills the authenticity gap between electronic documents and
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paper documents. It realizes “the management of rights in both tangible and
intangible form for electronic document”.
The three solutions we proposed are linked together to form a complete end-to-
end document DRM framework. The rights are managed across spatial, temporal
and physical domains. This is what the second generation DRM demands for, and
what our major contribution is.
Our future work involves more investigation into rights expression languages in
administrative environment. This environment contains many hierarchical struc-
tures. It requires that rights expression languages can support this structure,
resolve conflict between lower and higher layers, and derive rights along layers in
a proper way. Confidentiality is also extremely important in administrative en-
vironment, but not extensively studied in this thesis. We will apply more formal
security models in the future studies to address these problems.
RSE scheme also deserve more investigation. In Section 3.4 we have proposed a
tamper detection method based on the recovery of render sequence. This method
only survives the situations in which modifications are small. If the document has
been severely modified, we’re not able to recover the original sequence so we cannot
locate the tampered areas. A possible solution to this problem is adopting error
correction codes such as the Reed-Solomon codes or Davey-MacKay codes into the
generation of permutation, so that insertion / deleting / substitution to the per-
muted targets can be detected and corrected. Another direction of enhancement
to RSE scheme involves improving the authentication algorithm for permutation.
Our current method is based on the XTSP problem. The disadvantage of using
XTSP is that XTSP authenticates Hamiltonian tours instead of permutations. It
reduces the solutions spaces from n! to (n − 1)!. If it is possible to base the au-
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thentication algorithm onto other hard problems which takes permutations as the
solution, then the security of the system is improved and we can use shorter keys.
A possible candidate for such hard problem is Shamir’s permuted kernels problem
(PKP). The solution to PKP is a permutation. But to verify that a permutation
is a valid solution, the verifier needs a n-dimensional vector. This is in contrast to
the case of XTSP where only one number is needed to authenticate a Hamiltonian
tour. More work is required here to find a better solution.
Using Print Signature to authenticate printed documents has been extensively
studied in this thesis. Taking advantage of randomness in the printing process is
the basic idea of Print Signature. It can be expected that the other side of this
problem is to discover fixed features in the randomness. These features may be
unique for each printer. If such features are identified, we can use them to trace
the specific printer that has been used to print the document. This leads to a
new direction of media forensics and traitor-tracing. It provides another level of
protection which is very useful in governmental or military document management
systems.
The Internet is rapidly growing to be the major information medium. It enables
information delivery at light speed with low cost. The management of the con-
tent being transferred by Internet involves not only copyrighted materials, but also
materials whose significance extends beyond intellectual property categories. Busi-
ness and governmental documents are the most representative instances. DRM
systems in this field are not for restricting the usage, but for enabling the infor-
mation sharing among users, in a controlled manner.
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Appendix
Listing A.1: B/L XML source data (bl.xml)
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <bill_of_lading >
3 <bl_id >bl001 </bl_id>
4 <shipper_id >shipper001 </shipper_id >
5 <clerk_id >clerk001 </clerk_id >
6 <manager_id >manager001 </manager_id >
7 <internal_ref >000001 </internal_ref >
8 <vessel_name >star virgo</vessel_name >
9 <loading_port >shanghai </loading_port >








18 <weight >200</weight >
19 </product >
20 </consignment >
21 <status >both_not_confirmed </status >
22 <negotiable >









Listing A.2: RBAC XML Schema (RBAC.xsd)
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <xsd:schema targetNamespace="http:// example.net/RBAC"
3 xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema"
4 xmlns:o -ex="http://odrl.net /1.1/ODRL -EX"
5 elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="qualified">
6 <xsd:import namespace="http://odrl.net /1.1/ ODRL -EX"
7 schemaLocation="ODRL -EX -11. xsd"/>
8 <xsd:element name="rbac">




13 <!-- users element: defines all users. -->
14 <xsd:complexType >
15 <xsd:sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
16 <xsd:element name="user" minOccurs="0"
17 maxOccurs="unbounded">
18 <!-- user element: defines each user. -->
19 <xsd:complexType >
20 <xsd:attribute name="id" type="xsd:ID" use="required"/>







28 <!-- permissions element: defines all users. -->
29 <xsd:complexType >
30 <xsd:sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
31 <xsd:element name="permission" minOccurs="0"
32 maxOccurs="unbounded">




37 <!-- Each permission contains an ODRL agreement. -->
38 </xsd:sequence >
39 <xsd:attribute name="id" type="xsd:ID" use="required"/>







47 <!-- roles element: defines all roles. -->
48 <xsd:complexType >
49 <xsd:sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
50 <xsd:element name="role" minOccurs="0"
51 maxOccurs="unbounded">
52 <!-- role element: defines each role. -->
53 <xsd:complexType >
54 <xsd:sequence >
55 <xsd:element name="permission" maxOccurs="unbounded">
56 <!-- ref. to permissions assigned to the role. -->
57 <xsd:complexType >
148





63 <xsd:attribute name="id" use="required">
















80 <!-- uras element: defines all user -role assignments. -->
81 <xsd:complexType >
82 <xsd:sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
83 <xsd:element name="ura" minOccurs="0"
84 maxOccurs="unbounded">




89 <!-- ref. to the role element. -->
90 <xsd:complexType >




95 <xsd:element name="user" maxOccurs="unbounded">
96 <!-- ref. to user elements assigned to the role -->
97 <xsd:complexType >
















Listing A.3: Extended ODRL XML Schema (ODRLX-DD.xsd)
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <xsd:schema targetNamespace="http:// example.net/ODRLX -DD"
3 xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema"
4 xmlns:o -ex="http://odrl.net /1.1/ODRL -EX"
5 elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="qualified">
6 <xsd:import namespace="http://odrl.net /1.1/ ODRL -EX"
7 schemaLocation="ODRL -EX -11. xsd"/>
8 <xsd:element name="selector"
9 substitutionGroup="o-ex:contextElement">
10 <!-- Extension of ODRL context model. -->
11 <xsd:complexType >











23 <!-- Extension of ODRL constraint model. -->
24 <xsd:complexType >











Listing A.4: RBAC policy definition (rbac.xml)
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
2 <rbac:rbac xmlns:rbac="http:// example.net/RBAC"
3 xmlns:ox -dd="http:// example.net/ODRLX -DD"
4 xmlns:o -ex="http://odrl.net /1.1/ODRL -EX"
5 xmlns:o -dd="http://odrl.net /1.1/ODRL -DD"
6 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance"
7 xsi:schemaLocation="http:// example.net/RBAC RBAC.xsd
8 http: // example.net/ODRLX -DD ODRLX -DD.xsd
9 http: //odrl.net /1.1/ODRL -EX ODRL -EX -11. xsd
10 http: //odrl.net /1.1/ODRL -DD ODRL -DD -11. xsd">
11 <!-- Definition of users -->
12 <rbac:users >
13 <rbac:user rbac:id="u001" rbac:name="Alice"/>
14 <rbac:user rbac:id="u002" rbac:name="Cindy"/>
15 <rbac:user rbac:id="u003" rbac:name="Chris"/>
16 <rbac:user rbac:id="u004" rbac:name="Michael"/>
17 <rbac:user rbac:id="u005" rbac:name="Melvin"/>
18 <rbac:user rbac:id="u006" rbac:name="Steven"/>
19 <rbac:user rbac:id="u007" rbac:name="Sarah"/>
20 </rbac:users >
21 <!-- Definition of permissions -->
22 <rbac:permissions >
23 <rbac:permission rbac:id="p001"
24 rbac:name="shipper modify shipper_id">
25 <!-- ODRL rights: modify shipper_id if status is











37 <ox-dd:assert ox -dd:test=
38 "(/ bill_of_lading/status=’both_not_confirmed ’)||







46 rbac:name="clerk modify vessel_name">
47 <!-- ODRL rights: modify vessel_name if status is












59 <ox-dd:assert ox -dd:test=
60 "(/ bill_of_lading/status=’both_not_confirmed ’)||







68 rbac:name="manager modify manager_id">























































































Listing A.5: RBAC Schematron validator (rbac.sch)
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="US -ASCII"?>
2 <schema xmlns="http://www.ascc.net/xml/schematron">
3 <ns uri="http: // example.net/RBAC" prefix="r"/>
4 <title >Validation of B/L RBAC Policy </title >
5 <!-- Data type validation -->
6 <pattern name="Attribute ’role/permission/@ref ’ should reference
7 to a ’permission ’ element.">
8 <rule context="/r:rbac/r:roles/r:role/r:permission">
9 <assert test="/r:rbac/r:permissions/r:permission/@r:id=@r:ref">




14 <!-- Cardinality constraint -->




19 <assert test="count(parent:: */ r:user )=1">
20 Error: Role ’application ’ contains




25 <!-- Separation of duties constraint -->
26 <pattern name="User should not be assigned to both ’application ’
27 and ’shipper ’ roles.">
28 <rule context="/r:rbac/r:uras">
29 <assert test=
30 "not ((r:ura/r:role[@r:ref=’application ’]/../ r:user/@r:ref )=
31 (r:ura/r:role[@r:ref=’shipper ’]/../ r:user/@r:ref ))">
32 Error: Conflicting users in ’application ’ and ’shipper ’ roles.
33 </assert >
34 </rule>
35 </pattern >
36 </schema >
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